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a b s t r a c t
We introduce a model which allows to represent the probabilities associated with an arbitrary
measurement situation as it appears in different domains of science – from cognitive science to physics
– and use it to explain the emergence of quantum probabilities (the Born rule) as uniform fluctuations on
this measurement situation. Themodel exploits the geometry of simplexes to represent the states both of
the system and the measuring apparatus, in a way that the measurement probabilities can be derived as
the Lebesguemeasure of suitably defined convex subregions of the simplex under consideration. Although
the model we propose, which we call the uniform tension-reduction (UTR) model, is an abstract construct,
it admits physical realizations. In this articlewe consider a very simple and evocative one, using amaterial
point particlewhich is acted uponby special elasticmembranes,which by breaking and collapsing are able
to ‘‘release the tension’’ and produce the different possible outcomes. This easy to visualize mechanical
realization allows one to gain considerable insight into the possible hidden structure of a measurement
process, be it from a measurement associated with a situation in cognitive science or in physics, or in
any other domain. We also show that the UTR-model can be further generalized into a model describing
conditions of lack of knowledge generated by non-uniform fluctuations, which we call the general tension-
reduction (GTR) model. In this more general framework, which is more suitable to describe typical
experiments in cognitive science, we define and motivate a notion of universal measurement, describing
themost general possible condition of lack of knowledge in ameasurement, emphasizing that the uniform
fluctuations characterizing quantummeasurements can also be understood as an average over all possible
forms of non-uniform fluctuations which can be actualized in a measurement context. This means that
the Born rule of quantum mechanics can be understood as a first order approximation of a more general
non-uniform theory, thus explaining part of the great success of quantum probability in the description of
different domains of reality. And more specifically, also providing a possible explanation for the success
of quantum cognition, a research field in cognitive science employing the quantum formalism as a
modeling tool. This is the first part of a two-part article. In the second part (Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014a), the proof of the equivalence between universal measurements and uniform measurements, and
its significance for quantum theory as a first order approximation, is given and further analyzed.
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0/).1. Introduction
The great success of mathematics in the natural sciences has
always amazed and enchanted scientists (Wigner, 1960), and
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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cal notions in the description of physical entities (such as complex
Hilbert spaces with an Hermitian scalar product and self-adjoint
operators) is the perfect example of a theory which has taken full
advantage of an advanced mathematical language. But quantum
mechanics is not only remarkable for the sophistication of itsmath-
ematics: it is also for its ‘‘unreasonable’’ success in the description
of a vast class of phenomena, not limited to those traditionally in-
vestigated by quantum physicists.
The most surprising application of quantum physics, beyond
the domain of microphysics, is probably in the study of human
cognitive processes. Indeed, the mathematical structure of quan-
tum theory, with its non-classical (non-Kolmogorovian) probabil-
ity calculus, has been used with considerable success in the past
decade to model aspects of human cognition, such that a new field
of research within cognitive science, referred to as ‘quantum cog-
nition’, emerged (Aerts & Aerts, 1995; Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora,
& Sozzo, 2013; Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo,
2013; Blutner, 2009; Blutner, Pothos, & Bruza, 2013; Bruza, Buse-
meyer, & Gabora, 2009; Bruza, Kitto, McEvoy, & McEvoy, 2008;
Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009; Bruza, Lawless, Rijsbergen,
van, & Sofge, 2007; Bruza, Lawless et al., 2008; Bruza, Sofge, Law-
less, Rijsbergen, & Klusch, 2009; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Buse-
meyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011; Busemeyer, Wang, &
Townsend, 2006; Franco, 2009; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Haven &
Khrennikov, 2013; Khrennikov, 2010; Khrennikov & Haven, 2009;
Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Van Rijsbergen, 2004; Wang, Buse-
meyer, Atmanspacher, & Pothos, 2013; Yukalov & Sornette, 2010).
As a matter of fact, in quite some of these ‘quantum cognition
models’, it is shown that quantum probabilities are more adapted
and effective as compared to traditional approaches – based on
classical, Kolmogorovian probabilities – in capturing the way
humans deal with their thinking through concepts and their
combinations, and the way they make their decisions.
Of course, regarding this ability of the quantum formalism in
matching the description of not only microscopic entities, for the
description of which it was invented and construed, but also of
mental ones, as studied by cognitive and decision scientists, we can
always say, quoting Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), that:
‘‘[· · ·] many areas of inquiry that were historically part of
physics are now considered part of mathematics, including
complexity theory, geometry, and stochastic processes. Orig-
inally they were applied to physical entities and events. For
geometry, this was shapes of objects in space. For stochastic
processes, this was statistical mechanics of particles. Over time
they became generalized and applied to other domains. Thus,
what happens here with quantum mechanics mirrors the his-
tory of many, if not most, branches of mathematics.’’
In other terms, we can argue that the effectiveness of quantum
mechanics in other fields of investigation is just part of the effec-
tiveness ofmathematics in science in general.Without a doubt, the
understanding of the general link between mathematics, physics
and the humanmind, is a fundamentalmetaphysical question, cer-
tainlyworth investigating. In the present article, however, we shall
only be concerned with a more modest and specific, although not
less interesting, question, which is the following: Why the quan-
tum approach works so well in the modeling of so many systems
and their interactions, beyond the microscopic realm, and par-
ticularly the data of a great number of experiments on concepts,
notably those studying combinations of concept, and onhumande-
cision making?
Let us recall that since the fifties of the last century some
specific problems in economics, known as the Allais paradox
(Allais, 1953) and the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), already
indicated in those years the possibility of a violation, in humandecision processes, of the axioms of rational decision theories,
like the so-called expected utility hypothesis (Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944) and Sure-Thing Principle (Savage, 1954). In
the eighties and nineties, psychologists studied in a focused way
different types of human thought structures related to specific
situations, were fallacies and effects such as the conjunction fallacy
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and the disjunction effect (Tversky
& Shafir, 1992) are amongst the most well-known. One of the
possible hypotheses with respect to these examples is that they
constitute instances of human thought deviating from classical
logical thought.
Since then, indeed, decision researchers have discovered the
value of quantum modeling, making a profitable use of quantum
decision models for the description of a large number of experi-
mentally identified effects (Busemeyer et al., 2011, 2006; Lambert
Mogiliansky, Zamir, & Zwirn, 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009),
such as the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction effect (Aerts,
2009; Blutner, 2009; Franco, 2009; Khrennikov, 2010; Yukalov &
Sornette, 2010). In this regard, let us mention that an explanation
of the violation of the expected utility hypothesis and the Sure-
Thing Principle has now been modeled quantum cognitively, in
terms of quantum interference effects (Busemeyer et al., 2006;
Franco, 2007; Khrennikov & Haven, 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer,
2009), and that quantum structures have also proven their perti-
nence in the ambit of information retrieval research, a booming
and significant domain in computer science, building on semantic
space approaches (Van Rijsbergen, 2004;Widdows&Peters, 2003).
Concerning concept combinations, very significant deviations
from classicality were found in experiments conducted in the
eighties by Hampton (1988a,b). One of us and his collaborators
were able to recognize in these deviations from classicality for con-
cept combinations the unmistakable signature of the presence of
quantum structures, with their typical effects of interference, con-
textuality, entanglement and emergence (Aerts, 2009; Aerts, Aerts,
Broekaert, & Gabora, 2000; Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts, Gabora
et al., 2013; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Gabora & Aerts, 2002). Also the
so called ‘borderline contradictions’, experimentally identified de-
viations from classical logic when a concept is conjuncted with its
negation, could recently bemodeledwithin the quantum cognition
approach (Blutner et al., 2013; Sozzo, 2014). A key step in the elab-
oration of the approach of quantum structures modeling concepts
as in Aerts (2009), Aerts and Gabora (2005a,b) and Aerts, Gabora
et al. (2013), was the possibility to formalize a concept as an entity
in a specific state, and a context as a ‘‘surrounding’’ which is able to
produce a change (either deterministic or indeterministic) of such
state (Aerts & Gabora, 2005a; Gabora & Aerts, 2002).
Just to give an example, consider the concept Pet. When it is not
under the influence of a specific context, we can say that it is in its
ground state, which can be understood as a sort of basic prototype
of the concept. But as soon as the concept Pet is contextualized, for
instance in the ambit of the phrase Did you see the type of pet he
has? This explains that he is a weird person, its state will change,
so that its previous ground state will stop playing the role of a
prototype, which will now be played by its new state, as a sort of
new ‘contextualized prototype’.
The difference between the concept Pet in a ground state and in
an ‘‘excited’’ state, like the one associated with the above ‘‘weird
person context’’, can be assessed by submitting the concept to an
additional context: that of the mind of a human subject, when it is
asked to select a good exemplar of that concept, among a number
of possible choices. The difference between these two states will
then manifest, for example, in the fact that exemplars like Snake
and Spider will be chosenmuchmore frequently (i.e., with a higher
probability) when the Pet concept is in the ‘‘weird person’’ excited
state, rather than in its ground state.
It is worth noticing that an exemplar of a concept also repre-
sents a possible state for it, although usually of a more concrete
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specific state The Pet is a snake. Furthermore, the decision process
of a human subject, when selecting a good example of a concept
in a given state, is also to be understood as a context, changing its
state into amore concrete one. More precisely, one can think of the
process of placing the concept Pet in the context of other concepts
(as we have done when placing it in the phrase Did you see the type
of pet he has? This explains that he is a weird person), as a determi-
native process, similar to what in physics is called a preparation.
On the other hand,when a human subject is stimulated to give a
good example of the concept in that state, for instance choosing be-
tween Snake, Spider and other exemplars, then such context should
be thought of as a measurement, similar to the quantum measure-
ments of the first kind performed in modern physics’ laboratories.
Indeed, the process being interrogative, its outcomes are generally
unpredictable, and the different exemplars among which the sub-
ject has to choose define the eigenstates of the semantic observable
s/he is effectively measuring. And of course, the relative frequen-
cies of the measured outcomes of this observable will depend on
the state of preparation of the conceptual entity.
Now, coming back to our initial question, about the relevance
of the quantum formalism in the description of human’s cognitive
and decision processes, aswe said it was only inmore recent times,
in the beginning of this century, that it was possible to explicitly
show, relying on previous investigation in quantum probability,
that the observed violations of classical logic in Hampton’s and
other experiments could not, in any way, be modeled in the
ambit of a classical (Kolmogorovian) probability theory, not even
when fuzzy structures were allowed. This is a result with strong
implications for the nature of human thought itself, as it shows
that something with a genuine non-classical structure is at work,
‘‘in the background’’, in our cognitive processes. In other terms,
the success of quantum physics in describing concepts and their
combinations can, at least in part, be explained by considering
what is the main difference between a non-classical (quantum, or
quantum-like) probability theory, and a traditional classical one.
This difference lies essentially in that quantum probabilities
(andmore generally quantum-like probabilities) typically describe
conditions of lack of knowledge regarding properties that are
created during an experiment (the level of potentiality of the
system), whereas classical probabilities only describe conditions
of lack of knowledge regarding properties which were already
actual before the experiment was executed. This means that the
inadequacy of a classical probability calculus (which is implicit in
all traditional approaches, also those based on fuzzy-set theory) in
themodeling of human cognition is due precisely to its inadequacy
in describing processes of creation (to be understood here as
processes of actualization of potential properties), whereas the
adequacy of a quantumprobability calculus is due to the fact that it
was historically designed to do precisely this. In other terms, if the
quantum approach to cognition works so well, it is because both
the ‘microscopic layer’ of our physical reality, populated by so-
called quantum ‘‘particles’’, and the ‘cognitive layer’ of our mental
reality, populated by conceptual entities, are realms of genuine
‘potentialities’, not of the type of a ‘lack of knowledge of actualities’.
So, there are very convincing reasons explaining why quantum
physics performs so well in its modeling of human concepts, and
we can say that these reasons are now beginning to be fairly well
understood. Of course,muchmore canbe said in this regard, butwe
refer the reader to the above mentioned references and in particu-
lar to the analysis presented in Aerts, Gabora et al. (2013) (see also
Kitto, 2008 and the references cited therein), as our scope in the
present article, and in its continuation (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014a), is to concentrate on a different issue regarding the ‘‘un-
reasonable’’ effectiveness of the quantum mechanical formalism.
What we are here referring to is that orthodox quantum theory isnot the only available theory which is able to describe the level of
potentiality present in a system and the associated processes of ac-
tualization of potential properties.
To better explain what we mean, let us refer for example
to the investigation in the axiomatic and operational content
of physical theories, where standard quantum theory is built
axiomatically starting from a much more general and as much as
possible operationally founded approach. There have been many
of such axiomatic quantum approaches, and it was even John von
Neumann himself who instigated the domain of research (Birkhoff
& von Neumann, 1936). We can recall, among other pioneers of
this field of foundational investigation, Foulis and Randall (1978),
Jauch (1968), Ludwig (1983), Mackey (1963) and Piron (1976). Also
one of the authors, and his collaborators, were thoroughly engaged
in research on quantum axiomatic in the foregoing century (Aerts,
1982a, 1986, 1999a; Aerts et al., 1997a; Aerts, Coecke, & Smets,
1999; Aerts & Durt, 1994). In the course of these investigations
they were able to identify relevant mathematical structures which
are more general than those used in classical and quantum physics
and, interestingly, it was also possible to find explicit macroscopic
situations, not necessarily related to the description of entities of
the microworld, which were conveniently described only by these
more general intermediary structures, containing thepure classical
and pure quantum structures as special limit cases (Aerts, 1982b,
1991; Aerts et al., 2000; Aerts, Durt, Grib, Van Bogaert, & Zapatrin,
1993; Aerts & Van Bogaert, 1992).
Let us mention that the possibility of using quantum-like
structures of a very general kind to properly model macroscopic
situations has played an essential role in providing evidence that a
quantum-like approachwould also be appropriate for situations in
human cognition. In this regard, we can refer to the introduction
of the SCoP (State Context Property) formalism – a generalized
quantum theory – for the modeling of concepts in Aerts and
Gabora (2005a). Let us also mention the algebraic approach of
beim Graben and collegues (beim Graben & Atmanspacher, 2006,
2009; beimGraben, Filk, & Atmanspacher, 2013), inwhich classical
dynamical systems such as neural networks are shown to be able
to exhibit quantum-like properties in the case of coarse-graining
measurements, when testing properties that cannot distinguish
between epistemically equivalent states. Since in neuroscience
most measurements, such as electroencephalography or magnetic
resonance imaging, can be considered to be coarse-graining
measurements in this sense, this ‘‘epistemic quantization’’ has
direct implications for brain neurophysiology, and this without
needing to refer to a notion of a ‘‘quantum brain’’.
However, what was not expected in the beginning of these in-
vestigations, is that pure Hilbertian structures, and the associated
Born rule for calculating the probabilities of the outcomes, would
be so effective in the modeling of the main quantum effects iden-
tified in these domains, different from the microworld (Aerts &
Sozzo, 2012a,b). Therefore, the following question arises in a natu-
ral way: Why the Born rule, and not other ‘‘rules’’, associated with
more general quantum-like structures? In other terms: Why pure
quantum measurements, as considered in relation to microphysi-
cal systems, appear (so far) to be so effective in modeling the most
diverse data obtained in cognitive experiments?
This high degree of universality of the Born rule, associated
with pure quantum measurements, is quite surprising, as it is
not evident at all that what is usually done in experiments like
those conducted in cognitive science would be equivalent to what
physicists do in experiments with microscopic entities. Indeed,
each subject participating in a cognitive experiment necessarily
brings into it the uniqueness of her/hismind, i.e., the uniqueness of
her/his forma mentis, with its specific conceptual network forming
its inner memory structure. In other terms, it is as if in a physics’
laboratory each single outcome was obtained using a different
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possibly working according to different internal principles.
What we mean to say is that each participant, because of the
specificities of her/his mind structure, should be associated with
a different statistics of outcomes. This means that in a typical
cognitive experiments, involving a number of different subjects,
different ‘‘ways of choosing’’ (or different ‘‘ways of estimating
how participants would choose’’) a good exemplar of a given
concept are involved, and to each of these different ways of
choosing, different probabilities should in principle be associated.
This means that a cognitive experiment performed with a number
of different subjects should be considered as a collection of
different measurements, one for each participant. And each one of
these different measurements should a priori be associated with
probabilities having different numerical values (as each participant
chooses the outcomes differently), so that the overall probabilities
deduced from the results of all the participants in the experiment
are in fact averages over all these different probabilities.
Of course, we are here assuming that the different participants
can all be ideally subjected to the same initial condition. This is
certainly the case if, for instance, it corresponds to a concept in a
well-defined state, as expressed by a word, or a phrase, in relation
to a specific question. On the other hand, if the initial condition
corresponds to a less precisely defined situation, for instance in a
context requiring a decision, then fluctuations in the initial state
should also be considered. But these fluctuations can in principle
be reduced, whereas those relative to the measurement context,
incorporated in each participant’s mind, cannot.
So, a typical cognitive experiment is actually made of differ-
ent quantum-like measurements, delivering different numerical
values for the outcomes (i.e., for the exemplars), but all these
different measurements are considered to be unidentifiable, and
therefore are not distinguished in the final statistics. This means
that the experimenters usually proceed as if they would lack
knowledge about the different ‘‘ways of choosing’’ employedby the
different participants, and simply average over all their individual
‘‘hidden measurements’’, to obtain the final statistics. Considering
the above, we are undoubtedly confronted with a little mystery:
How is it possible that the very specific Born rule, associated with
pure quantum structures, appears to be so good in describing the
data gathered from experiments which are in fact statistical mix-
tures of different measurements, associated with different proba-
bilities?
Here something quite surprising apparently happens: when
averaging over different types of measurements, described by
probabilities which are in principle different from those obtained
by the quantum mechanical Born rule, the result is nevertheless
statistically equal to the Born rule. This means that it should be
possible to understand orthodox quantum mechanics as a theory
describing the probabilistics of outcomes for measurements that
are mixtures of all imaginable types of measurements, and this
would also explain why the quantum statistics is so effective, in
so many regions of reality, also regarding its numerical statistical
predictions.
It is precisely the purpose of the present article, and of its second
part (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a), to show that what is
indirectly suggested by the experiments performed by cognitive
scientists is actually true, i.e., that orthodox quantumprobabilities,
described by the Born rule, can be interpreted as the probabilities
of a first-order non-classical theory, describing situations in which
an experimenter does not know anything about the nature of
the interaction between the entity performing the measurement
(in physics, the measuring apparatus; in cognitive sciences, the
participating subject) and the entity being measured (in physics,
a microscopic ‘‘particle’’ in a given state; in cognitive sciences, a
concept in a given state).More precisely, our aim is to introduce and motivate a no-
tion of universal measurement, defined as an average over all
possible kinds of measurements, and show that such average
gives rise, exactly, to the Born rule of quantum mechanics, thus
providing what we think is a fascinating explanation of why the
quantum statistics performs so well, in so many experimental am-
bits. It would do so because it can be understood as a first order
theory in the modeling of measurement data.
It should bementioned that the idea of universalmeasurements
was firstly introduced by one of us, more than one decade ago
(Aerts, 1998, 1999b), in the ambit of his analysis of classical, quan-
tum and intermediary structures. It was already suggested at that
time that when we are in a condition of maximal lack of knowl-
edge, in a given experimental situation, what we may actually end
up performing is a ‘‘huge’’ kind of measurement – a universal mea-
surement – consisting in choosing at-random between all possible
measurements. The interesting idea that was already brought for-
ward then, although only as a conjecture, is that if there is ‘‘one’’
physical reality, then there should also be ‘‘one’’ universal mea-
surement, connecting an initial state to a final state.
This uniqueness of universal measurements was indirectly
suggested by the existence of a famous theorem of quantum
mechanics, Gleason’s theorem, which affirms that ‘‘if the transition
probability depends only on the state before the measurement
and on the eigenstate of the measurement that is actualized after
the measurement, then this transition probability is equal to the
quantum transition probability’’. And since this Gleason property
(dependence of the transition probability only on the state before
the measurement and the eigenstate that is actualized after the
measurement) is exactly a property that is satisfied, by definition,
by a universal measurement, the theorem suggested (within the
limit of Hilbertian structures) the possibility that the transition
probabilities connected with universal measurements would
be precisely the quantum mechanical transition probabilities,
described by the Born rule.
The idea, however, remained only conjectural at that time,
because of difficulties related to the so-called Bertrand Paradox,
i.e., to the fact that probabilities may depend on the randomization
method chosen to perform a uniform average, when the number
of possible cases is infinite (Bertrand, 1889). But these difficulties
have now been overcome, thanks to a transparent definition of
the uniform randomization over measurements, conceived as a
limit of randomized discrete systems, much in the spirit of what
is traditionally done in physics when averages over paths are
performed, for instance in the study of Brownian motion.
The above was to emphasize that the results contained in
this paper, and in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014a), are of
interest not only for cognitive scientists, but also for physicists,
as the possibility of understanding the measurements of quantum
mechanics as universal measurements is new and relevant in both
domains of investigation. Now, to be able to study the ‘‘huge’’
average associated with a universal measurement, we need a
suitable and sufficiently general theoretical framework, and this
brings us to the second element of novelty contained in this paper.
Indeed, this framework will be provided by an idealized system
– that we call the general tension-reduction (GTR) model – able
to describe a virtually infinite number of different measurement
situations, in different dimensions, ranging from the classical
deterministic ones, associated with processes of pure discovery, to
the ‘‘solipsistic’’ indeterministic ones, associated with processes
of pure creation, with in the middle the pure quantum regime,
expressing a sort of equilibrium between these two extreme
conditions of pure discovery and pure creation.
It should be mentioned that the GTR-model that we introduce
here is a non-trivial multidimensional generalization of what is
known as the sphere-model (Aerts, Coecke, Durt, & Valckenborgh,
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(Aerts, 1998, 1999b; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013b) and, interestingly,
for the special cases of 1, 2 and 3 dimensions (i.e., 2, 3 and 4 out-
comes, respectively), it describes a systemwhich in principle could
be realized in a laboratory, by means of specially designed mate-
rials. One of the great advantages of the model is that it allows
to fully understanding and even visualizing what goes on dur-
ing a measurement, when the state of the entity under investi-
gation collapses into an eigenstate of the measured observable,
thus providing a considerable insight into many aspects of quan-
tum structures. In particular, it explicitly shows that quantum and
quantum-like measurements can be understood in terms of hid-
den (potential) measurement interactions, which are actualized in
an unpredictableway each time an experiment is performed, in ac-
cordance with the so-called hidden-measurement approach (Aerts,
1986, 1998, 1999b; Coecke, 1995; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013a).
Another important advantage of the GTR-model is that it al-
lows to represent all kinds of possible distributions of hidden in-
teractions, of which the pure quantum one only constitutes a very
special case, corresponding to the choice of a uniform probability
density ρu. Thanks to this great level of generality, it becomes pos-
sible to use the model as a general theoretical framework to state
and derive our result regarding the correspondence between uni-
versal measurements and quantummeasurements (the result will
only be enunciated and explained in the present article, the proof
being given in Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a). Also, considering
that the GTR-model is a more general theoretical framework than
the Hilbert-model, it can be exploited to model situations where
the first order approximation expressed by the Born rule would
not be sufficient, i.e., when some knowledge about the fluctuations
present in the experimental context would be available, a possibil-
ity which is more likely to manifest in cognitive experiments than
in physics experiments.
The work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
somebasic elements of the quantum formalism, to define notations
and to allow to more easily establish, in the subsequent sections,
the correspondence between quantum measurements and the
measurement described in the GTR-model. In Section 3,we start by
analyzing the GTR-model in the special case where the probability
density is uniform ρ ≡ ρu. This special case, which we refer to as
the uniform tension-reduction (UTR) model, is already sufficiently
general to describe all possible probabilities arising in a single
measurement, a fact thatwill be emphasized in Section 5, bymeans
of a representation theorem.
In our study of the UTR-model (the GTR-model with a uni-
form probability density), we will proceed in a pedestrian way,
by first describing the one-dimensional (two-outcome) and two-
dimensional (three-outcomes) situations, then generalizing the
description to an arbitrary number of dimensions. Although the
model is per se abstract, in our analysis wewill mostly concentrate
on one of its possible physical realizations, using special elastic hy-
permembranes which can break and collapse in a specific way.
In Section 4, we use the UTR-model to shed some light into the
phenomenon of entanglement, showing that the process of emer-
gence it subtends requires additional dimensions to be described.
In Section 5, as we said, we state a general representation theorem,
showing that the UTR-model (and equally so the Hilbert-model) is
a ‘‘universal probabilistic machine’’, able to represent any possible
probabilities emerging from a single measurement. We also show
that these probabilities can either be understood as the result of the
presence of a uniform mixture of pure measurements or, in a sort
of complementary picture, of a uniform mixture of initial states.
In Section 6, we introduce the more general GTR-model, which
also admits non-uniform probability densities (thus generalizing
the UTR-model), and use it to motivate a notion of universal
measurement, which will be defined in a physically transparentand mathematically precise way. This will allow us to state our
theorem about the equivalence between universal measurements
and measurements characterized by uniform fluctuations (and
therefore their correspondence with the quantum mechanical
Born rule), which will be formally proven only in the second part
of this article (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a).
In Section 7, we analyze in some detail the ampler structural
richness of the GTR-model, by investigating, in the two-outcome
case, the probabilities associated with sequential measurements,
showing that they cannot in general be fitted into a Hilbertian
or Kolmogorovian structure. Finally, in Section 8, we offer some
conclusive remarks.
2. Quantum probabilities for a single observable
In this sectionwe present some elements of the basic formalism
of quantum mechanics, in relation to the measurement of a finite
dimensional observable, which can either be degenerate or non-
degenerate. In doing so, we will also describe the special case
of a compound system made of two entities, and emphasize the
difference between product and non-product (entangled) states.
In orthodox quantum theory, the state of an entity (for a
physicist it can be a microscopic entity, such as an electron, for
a cognitive scientist, a concept, or a situation apt for a decision
process) is described by a vector space over the field C of complex
numbers – the so-called Hilbert space H – equipped with a
(sesquilinear) inner product ⟨·|·⟩, which maps two vectors |φ⟩,
|ψ⟩ to a complex number ⟨φ|ψ⟩, and consequently with a norm
∥ |ψ⟩∥ ≡ √⟨ψ |ψ⟩, which assigns a positive length to each vector.
In this article we only consider Hilbert spaces having a finite
number of dimensions, and will denoteHN a Hilbert space which
is an N-dimensional vector space.
An observable is a measurable quantity of the entity under con-
sideration, and in quantum theory is represented by a self-adjoint
operator A, acting on vectors of the Hilbert space, i.e., A : |ψ⟩ →
A|ψ⟩. In our case, being the Hilbert space N-dimensional, A can
be entirely described by means of its N eigenvectors |ai⟩ and the
associated (real) eigenvalues ai, obeying the eigenvalue relations
A|ai⟩ = ai|ai⟩, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} ≡ IN . If the eigenvectors have
been duly normalized, so that in addition to the orthogonality rela-
tion ⟨ai|aj⟩ = δij, i, j ∈ IN , they also obey the completeness relation
i∈IN |ai⟩⟨ai| = I, where I denotes the unit operator, they can be
used to construct the orthogonal projections Pi ≡ |ai⟩⟨ai|, i ∈ IN ,
obeying

i∈IN Pi = I, PiPj = Piδij, i, j ∈ IN , which in turn can be
used to write the observable A as the (spectral) sum:
A = IA =

i∈IN
Pi

A =

i∈IN
aiPi. (1)
Similarly, if |ψ⟩ ∈ HN , ∥ψ∥2 = ⟨ψ |ψ⟩ = 1, is a normalized
vector describing the state of the entity, it can be written as the
sum:
|ψ⟩ = I|ψ⟩ =

i∈IN
Pi

|ψ⟩
=

i∈IN
|ai⟩⟨ai|ψ⟩ =

i∈IN
√
xieiαi |ai⟩, (2)
where for the last equality we have written the complex numbers
⟨ai|ψ⟩ in the polar form ⟨ai|ψ⟩ = √xieiαi . Clearly, being |ψ⟩ nor-
malized to 1, the positive real numbers xi must obey:
i∈IN
xi = 1. (3)
The non-degenerate case
When we measure an observable A in a practical experiment
(a physicist does so by letting the microscopic entity interact with
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human concept interact with a humanmind, according to a certain
protocol, if concepts are studied, or by collecting the decision
results, if situations lending themselves to human decisions are
studied), we can obtain one of the N eigenvalues ai, i ∈ IN , and
if these N eigenvalues are all different, we say that the spectrum
of A is non-degenerate. Consequently, the measurement has N
distinguishable possible outcomes.
In general terms, the measurement of an observable A is a
process during which the state of the entity undergoes an abrupt
transition – called ‘‘collapse’’ in the quantum jargon – passing
from the initial state |ψ⟩ to a final state which is one of the
eigenvectors |ai⟩ of A, associated with the eigenvalue ai, i ∈ IN .
The process is non-deterministic, and we can only describe it in
probabilistic terms, by means of a ‘‘golden rule’’, called the Born
rule, which states the following: the probability P(|ψ⟩ → |ai⟩), for
the transition |ψ⟩ → |ai⟩, is given by the square of the length of
the vector Pi|ψ⟩, i.e., the square of the length of the initial vector
once it has been projected onto the eigenspace of A corresponding
to the eigenvalue ai. More explicitly:
P(|ψ⟩ → |ai⟩) = ∥Pi|ψ⟩∥2 = ⟨ψ |PiPi|ψ⟩
= ⟨ψ |Pi|ψ⟩ = ⟨ψ |ai⟩ ⟨ai|ψ⟩ = |⟨ai|ψ⟩|2 = xi, (4)
for all i ∈ IN . And of course, according to (3), we have:
i∈IN
P(|ψ⟩ → |ai⟩) =

i∈IN
xi = 1, (5)
as it must be, by definition of a probability.
The degenerate case
We consider now a degenerate observable A. This means that
some of the ai will have the same value, and therefore are not
distinguishable, as outcomes, by the experimenter. To describe this
situation, we consider n disjoint subsets IMk of IN ≡ {1, . . . ,N},
k = 1, . . . , n, having Mk elements each, with 0 ≤ Mk ≤ N
and
n
k=1 Mk = N , so that ∪nk=1 IMk = IN . We then assume that
the eigenvectors |ai⟩ whose index belong to a same set IMk are
all associated with a same eigenvalue aIMk , Mk times degenerate.
Therefore, defining the projectors PIMk ≡

i∈IMk Pi, onto the Mk-
dimensional eigenspace associated with the eigenvalues aIMk , (1)
becomes:
A =
n
k=1

i∈IMk
aiPi =
n
k=1
aIMk

i∈IMk
Pi
 = n
k=1
aIMk PIMk , (6)
and of course, (6) gives back (1) when each of the sets IMk is
a singleton {k}, i.e., a set containing the single element k, and
consequently n = N .
For a degenerate observable we cannot anymore associate
one-dimensional eigenspaces to the distinguishable eigenvalues.
Accordingly, measurements will now produce state transitions of
the form |ψ⟩ → |ψIMk ⟩, k = 1, . . . , n, where:
|ψIMk ⟩ =
PIMk |ψ⟩
∥PIMk |ψ⟩∥
=

i∈IMk
Pi|ψ⟩ 
i∈IMk
⟨ψ |Pi|ψ⟩
=

i∈IMk
√
xieiαi |ai⟩ 
i∈IMk
xi
=

i∈IMk
 xi
j∈IMk
xj
eiαi |ai⟩. (7)According to the Born rule, for k = 1, . . . , n, we have the transition
probabilities:
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψIMk ⟩) = ∥PIMk |ψ⟩∥2 = ⟨ψ |PIMk PIMk |ψ⟩
= ⟨ψ |PIMk |ψ⟩
=

i∈IMk
⟨ψ |ai⟩ ⟨ai|ψ⟩ =

i∈IMk
|⟨ai|ψ⟩|2
=

i∈IMk
xi, (8)
and of course
n
k=1
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψIMk ⟩) =
n
k=1

i∈IMk
xi =

i∈IN
xi = 1. (9)
Compound systems
To illustrate the importance of the above distinction between
degenerate and non-degenerate observables, we describe the
important case of compound systems, consisting in more than a
single entity. For sake of simplicity, we limit our discussion to the
case of a compound system made of only two entities, which can
only be in two different states. Typically, a physicist will consider
two spin- 12 entities, like two electrons, whereas a psychologist
studying concepts will consider the combinations of two concepts,
allowing for each of them only two possible exemplars. Then, the
Hilbert space is the 4-dimensional complex space H4 = C4, and
since there are two entities, it can also be described as the tensor
productH2⊗H2 = C2⊗C2, where the first 2-dimensional Hilbert
spaceH2 = C2 is associated with the first entity (indicated by the
index 1 in the following), and the second identical Hilbert space is
associated with the second entity (indicated by the index 2).
A product observable A can then be written as the tensor
product A = A1 ⊗ A2, where A1 acts on the first entity and A2
acts on the second one. More specifically, A1 ⊗ A2 corresponds to
the coincident measurement of A1 on the first entity and A2 on the
second one. This can be also expressed bywriting A as the ordinary
product of two commuting observables: A = (A1 ⊗ I)(I ⊗ A2) =
(I⊗ A2)(A1 ⊗ I), where A1 ⊗ I is the observable acting on the first
entity via A1, but doing nothing to the second entity, whereas I⊗A2
does nothing to the first entity, but acts on the second one via A2.
In other terms, A1 ⊗ I corresponds to an observation only on the
first entity, whereas I ⊗ A2 to an observation only on the second
one, and their product corresponds to a coincident observation on
the entity which is a compound of both entities.
Let us show that A = A1 ⊗ A2 has a non-degenerate spectrum
of eigenvalues, whereas A1 ⊗ I and I⊗ A2 have doubly degenerate
eigenvalues. For this, we introduce inH4 the four (tensor product)
base vectors |µ, ν⟩ ≡ |µ⟩1 ⊗ |ν⟩2, µ, ν ∈ {1, 2}, where |µ⟩1, µ =
1, 2, are the two eigenvectors of A1, with non-degenerate eigen-
values a1;µ, µ = 1, 2, and |ν⟩1, ν = 1, 2, are the two eigenvec-
tors of A2, with non-degenerate eigenvalue a2;ν , ν = 1, 2. Clearly,
A|µ, ν⟩ = A1 ⊗ A2|µ⟩1 ⊗ |ν⟩2 = A1|µ⟩1 ⊗ A2|ν⟩2 = a1;µ|µ⟩1 ⊗
a2;ν |ν⟩2 = a1;µa2;ν |µ, ν⟩, that is, the |µ, ν⟩ are the eigenvectors
of A, associated with the four eigenvalues a1;µa2;ν , µ, ν = 1, 2,
which are all distinct, and so A is non-degenerate. On the other
hand, A1 ⊗ I|µ, ν⟩ = A1 ⊗ I| |µ⟩1 ⊗ |ν⟩2 = A1|µ⟩1 ⊗ I| |ν⟩2 =
a1;µ|µ⟩1⊗ 1|ν⟩2 = a1;µ|µ, ν⟩, that is, the |µ, ν⟩ are also eigenvec-
tors of A1 ⊗ I, but this time both |µ, 1⟩ and |µ, 2⟩ are associated
with the same eigenvalue a1;µ, which therefore is doubly degener-
ate, for eachµ = 1, 2. And of course, the same holds true for I⊗A2.
In general, a state |ψ⟩ of the two-entity system can be written
in the above eigen-basis as the superposition:
|ψ⟩ = √x1eiα1 |1, 1⟩ + √x2eiα2 |1, 2⟩
+√x3eiα3 |2, 1⟩ + √x4eiα4 |2, 2⟩, (10)
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different outcomes, associated with the probabilities:
P(|ψ⟩ → |1, 1⟩) = |⟨1, 1|ψ⟩|2 = x1, (11)
P(|ψ⟩ → |1, 2⟩) = |⟨1, 2|ψ⟩|2 = x2, (12)
P(|ψ⟩ → |2, 1⟩) = |⟨2, 1|ψ⟩|2 = x3, (13)
P(|ψ⟩ → |2, 2⟩) = |⟨2, 2|ψ⟩|2 = x4. (14)
On the other hand, a measurement of A1⊗ I can only produce two
different outcomes, associated with the probabilities:
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{1,2}⟩) =
2
ν=1
|⟨1, ν|ψ⟩|2 = x1 + x2, (15)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{3,4}⟩) =
2
ν=1
|⟨2, ν|ψ⟩|2 = x3 + x4, (16)
and similarly, a measurement of I⊗ A2 is associated with the two
transition probabilities:
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{1,3}⟩) =
2
µ=1
|⟨µ, 1|ψ⟩|2 = x1 + x3, (17)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{2,4}⟩) =
2
µ=1
|⟨µ, 2|ψ⟩|2 = x2 + x4. (18)
We conclude this brief description of the two-entity system
by mentioning the difference between product (non-entangled)
states, and non-product (entangled) states. The latters are associ-
ated with the possibility of creating correlations when measure-
ments are jointly performed on the entity which is the compound
of both entities, whereas the formers cannot produce any correla-
tions. A product state is a state of the form |ψ⟩1 ⊗ |ψ⟩2, where
|ψ⟩1 = √aeiα|1⟩1 +
√
beiβ |2⟩1, with a + b = 1, and |ψ⟩2 =√
ceiδ|1⟩2 +
√
deiγ |2⟩2, with c + d = 1. This means that:
|ψ⟩1 ⊗ |ψ⟩2 =
√
acei(α+δ)|1, 1⟩ + √adei(α+γ )|1, 2⟩
+√bcei(β+δ)|2, 1⟩ + √bdei(β+γ )|2, 2⟩. (19)
Therefore, if we use a product state (19), instead of a general state
(10), we obtain for the different transition probabilities associated
with themeasurements of the three observables A = A1⊗A2, A1⊗I
and I⊗ A2:
P(|ψ⟩ → |1, 1⟩) = ac, P(|ψ⟩ → |1, 2⟩) = ad, (20)
P(|ψ⟩ → |2, 1⟩) = bc, P(|ψ⟩ → |2, 2⟩) = bd, (21)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{1,2}⟩) = a(c + d) = a, (22)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{3,4}⟩) = b(c + d) = b, (23)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{1,3}⟩) = c(a+ b) = c, (24)
P(|ψ⟩ → |ψ{2,4}⟩) = d(a+ b) = d. (25)
Setting x1 = ac , x2 = ad, x3 = bc , and x4 = bd, we thus obtain
that state (10), to be a product state, must obey
x1 = (x1 + x2)(x1 + x3), x2 = (x1 + x2)(x2 + x4),
x3 = (x3 + x4)(x1 + x3), x4 = (x3 + x4)(x2 + x4). (26)
Clearly, the eigenvectors |µ, ν⟩ ≡ |µ⟩1⊗|ν⟩2,µ, ν = 1, 2, trivially
obey the above relations. For instance, state |1, 1⟩ corresponds to
x1 = 1 and x2 = x3 = x4 = 0, which obviously obey (26). On the
other hand, a typical entangled state, like a so-called singlet state of
the form |ψ⟩ = 1√
2
(|1, 2⟩ − |2, 1⟩), corresponding to x2 = x3 = 12
and x1 = x4 = 0, disobeys (26), as by replacing these values in the
first relation above, we obtain 0 = 14 , which is a contradiction.3. The UTR-model
In this section we present an abstract model, which we call the
uniform tension-reduction (UTR) model, allowing for the descrip-
tion and representation of general – single observable – measure-
ment situations, characterized by an arbitrary (finite) number of
different possible outcomes. The model is universal, in the sense
that probabilities of any numerical value can be represented by
it. Being an abstract construction, its usefulness does not depend
on the existence of possible physical realizations of its structure.
However, the possibility of describing the UTR-model by means of
a specific mechanical realization of it, will prove to be quite help-
ful in gaining greater intuition about the hidden structure which
is ‘‘behind’’ a measurement in general, and a quantum measure-
ment in particular. This is what we shall do below, keeping always
in mind that the ‘‘universal machine’’ we shall describe only con-
stitutes one of many possible physical realizations of the abstract
structure of the UTR-model (for a different physical realization, in
the two-outcome case, see for instance Aerts, 1986).
It is important to clarify what we mean exactly when we say
that the UTR-model admits a mechanical realization. By this, we
mean that we can define a mechanical system, i.e., a ‘‘machine’’,
functioning in a logical way, able to represent the outcomes
of whatever measurement, and the associated probabilities. But
by this we do not necessarily mean that such system can be
constructed in reality, using today known materials, and this for
at least three reasons: the first one is that a theoretical, abstract
model is always an idealization of more concrete systems, which
can only constitute approximations (in the same way that real
Newtonian systems approximate idealized Newtonian systems,
when for instance they assume that there are no frictions); the
second one is that we are certainly not able today to manufacture
materials that behave exactly in the same way the model behaves,
although we may be able to do so in a near future; the third one
is that in any case, for more than four outcomes, the machine
necessitates more than three spatial dimensions in order to
operate, and of course we cannot construct macroscopic objects of
four or more spatial dimensions.
More specifically,wewill realize the different logical operations
in our UTR-model by using the key notion of a ‘breakable elastic
membrane’ (which will become a hypermembrane for more than
4 outcomes). This because, to the best of our knowledge, it pro-
vides the simplest physical realization of a measurement situation
allowing not only for a clear identification of the source of indeter-
minism, but also for the possibility of using the Lebesgue measure
to derive a corresponding probability calculus. In addition to that,
the membranes, with their ‘tension lines’, are very close to what
we imagine to possibly be the dynamics unfolding in our brains,
during a decision making process. In other terms, the UTR-model
is perfectly compatible with what our intuition tells us, regarding
the way we create and break a set of competing tensions in our
mind, in a given decisional context, as we will better explain in the
last part of this section.
But before that, we have to proceed step by step, describing first
the two-outcome situation (N = 2), then the three-outcome situ-
ation (N = 3), and finally the general situation, with an arbitrary
number N of outcomes.
The N = 2 case, with two outcomes
The entity is a simple material point particle (to be understood
also as an abstract entity representative of the state of the system
under consideration) living in a Euclidean space Rn, n ≥ 2,
and measurements, which will be denoted e{1}{2}, can only have
two outcomes. The procedure to follow to perform e{1}{2} is the
following. The experimenter takes a sticky, breakable and uniform
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vectors xˆ1 and xˆ2 , with the two regions A1 and A2 generated by the presence of the
point particle in x. The vector λ, here in region A2 , indicates the point where the
elastic breaks.
elastic band, and stretches it over a 1-dimensional simplex1 S1
(1-simplex), generated by two orthonormal vectors xˆ1 and xˆ2.
Once the uniform elastic band is in place, the particle, by moving
deterministically toward it, along a trajectory that will depend on
the structure of the state space, sticks to it at a particular point
x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2, x1 + x2 = 1, defining the state of the particle
on the elastic (we represent Euclidean vectors in bold).
For instance, if the point particle is representative of a two-
state quantum-mechanical system (qubit), the state space can be
put into correspondence with the Bloch sphere (also called the
Poincaré sphere), and the deterministicmap that brings the particle
in contact with the sticky elastic band corresponds to a movement
along a rectilinear path, orthogonal to the latter, as it will be better
explained in Section 7.
When the particle is in place on the elastic, two disjoint regions
A1 and A2 can be distinguished, which are respectively the region
bounded by vectors xˆ2 and x, and the region bounded by vectors
x and xˆ1 (see Fig. 1). Then, after some time, as the uniform elastic
band is made of a breakable material, it inevitably breaks, at some
a priori unpredictable point λ (see Fig. 1). If λ ∈ A1, the elastic
band, when it contracts, it draws the particle to point xˆ1, whereas
if λ ∈ A2, the elastic draws the particle to point xˆ2, which is the
‘‘collapse process’’ depicted in Fig. 2.
We can observe that to each breaking point λ, it corresponds
a specific interaction between the particle and the elastic band,
which draws the former to its final state xˆ1, or xˆ2 (the two possible
outcomes of the measurement). In other terms, the measurement
e{1}{2} is a collection of hidden (potential) pure measurements, only
one of which is each time selected (actualized), when the elastic
breaks. Let us observe that given the particle state x, all pure
measurements but one are deterministic, as forλ = x the outcome
remains clearly indeterminate, in the classical sense of a system in
a condition of unstable equilibrium.
To calculate the probabilities of the two outcomes, one needs
to observe that being the elastic uniform, all its points have exactly
the same probability to break (the elastic is a physical realization
of a uniform probability density). Therefore, the probability P(Ai)
for the elastic to break in region Ai, i = 1, 2, is simply given by the
ratio between the length of the segment Ai (the Lebesgue measure
µL(Ai) of region Ai) and the total length ∥xˆ2 − xˆ1∥ =
√
2 of the
band (the Lebesgue measure µL(S1) of the 1-simplex): P(Ai) =
µL(Ai)
µL(S1)
= µL(Ai)√
2
. From Pythagorean theorem, and x1 + x2 = 1, it
immediately follows that (see Fig. 1) µL(Ai) =

x21 + x21 =
√
2x1,
so that P(Ai) = xi, i = 1, 2. And since the particle is drawn to xˆi
when the elastic breaks in Ai, the probability P(x → xˆi) for the
1 A simplex is a generalization of the notion of a triangle. A 1-simplex is a line
segment; a 2-simplex is an equilateral triangle; a 3-simplex is a tetrahedron; a 4-
simplex is a pentachoron; and so on.transition x → xˆi is precisely the probability P(Ai) for the elastic
to break in Ai, so that we can write:
P(x→ xˆi) = P(Ai) = µL(Ai)
µL(S1)
= xi, i = 1, 2. (27)
In other terms, in accordance with (4), measurement e{1}{2}
is isomorphic to the measurement of an observable A in a two-
dimensional complex Hilbert spaceH2, if we represent the quan-
tum state vector |ψ⟩ = √x1eiα1 |a1⟩ + √x2eiα2 |a2⟩ ∈ H2, by a
vector x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2, whose components are precisely the tran-
sition probabilities (see Section 2).
The N = 3 case, with three outcomes
We consider now the slightly more complex situation consist-
ing of measurements which can have three possible outcomes. The
entity is always amaterial point particle, living in a Euclidean space
Rn, n ≥ 3. Different typologies of (non-trivial) measurements can
be carried out in this case. More precisely, we can distinguish four
different typologies ofmeasurements: e{1}{2}{3}, e{1,2}{3}, e{1,3}{2} and
e{2,3}{1}. We start describing the first one, which corresponds to the
situation where all three outcomes can be distinguished by the ex-
perimenter (non-degenerate measurement).
The procedure to follow to perform e{1}{2}{3} is the following.
The experimenter takes a sticky, uniformly breakable elastic
membrane and stretches it over a 2-dimensional simplex S2
generated by three orthonormal vectors xˆ1, xˆ2 and xˆ3, attaching it
to its three vertex points. Once the uniform elastic membrane is in
place, the particle, by moving deterministically toward it (along a
trajectory that is not important here to specify, which will depend
on the structure of the state space; see the discussion at the end of
Section 7, for the case of a Hilbertian state space), sticks to it at a
particular point x = x1xˆ1 + x2xˆ2 + x3xˆ3, with x1 + x2 + x3 = 1,
defining the state of the particle on the membrane.
When this happens, three different disjoint convex regions
A1, A2 and A3 can be distinguished on the membrane’s surface,
delimited by the three ‘‘tension lines’’ which connect x to the
vertex points of S2 (see Fig. 3). Then, after some time the elastic
membrane breaks, at some unpredictable point λ (see Fig. 3). If
λ ∈ A1, then the tearing propagates inside the entire region A1,
but not in the other two regions A2 and A3 (due to the presence
of the tension lines), causing also its 2 anchor points xˆ2 and xˆ3
to tear away (from a physical point of view, the ‘‘collapse’’ of the
membrane in region A1 can be understood as a sort of explosive-
like reaction of disintegration of its atomic constituents). Once
the membrane is detached from the two above mentioned anchor
points, being elastic, it contracts toward the remaining anchor
point xˆ1, drawing in this way the point particle, which is attached
to it, to the same final position (see Fig. 4). Similarly, if λ ∈ A2, the
final state of the particle will be xˆ2, and if λ ∈ A3, the final state of
the particle will be xˆ3.
As for the previous description of the one-dimensional elastic
band, we can observe that to each breaking point λ ∈ S2, corre-
sponds a specific interaction between the particle and the elastic
membrane, drawing the former to its final state. In other terms, the
measurement e{1}{2}{3} is formed by a collection of potential pure
measurements, only one of which is each time actualized when
the elastic breaks. Again, we observe that all these pure measure-
ments are deterministic, with the exception of those with a λ at
the boundaries of two (or three) regions, as in this case it remains
indeterminate which region will actually disintegrate. But of these
special λ we do not have to worry, as they are of zero measure in
the determination of the transition probabilities.
Following the same logic as for the two-outcome case, we have
for the transitions x → xˆi, i = 1, 2, 3, the probabilities P(x →
xˆ1) = P(Ai) = µL(Ai)µL(S2) = 2√3µL(Ai), were for the last equality we
have used the fact that the area µL(S2) of an equilateral triangle S2
D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75 59Fig. 2. The breaking of the elastic causes the particle to be drawn to point xˆ2 .Fig. 3. A 2-dimensional triangular membrane attached to the three vertex unit
vectors xˆ1 , xˆ2 and xˆ3 , with the three disjoint convex regionsA1 ,A2 , andA3 , generated
by the presence of the particle in x (the ‘‘tension lines’’ of demarcation between the
three regions correspond to the clear dashed lines in the drawing). The vector λ,
here in region A1 , indicates the point where the elastic membrane breaks.
of side
√
2, is
√
3
2 . To calculate the area of the triangle µL(Ai), we
observe that its base is
√
2 and its height hi =

3
2xi, so that its
area is
√
2hi
2 =
√
3
2 xi. Thus, in accordance with (4), we obtain
P(x→ xˆi) = P(Ai) = µL(Ai)
µL(S2)
= xi, i = 1, 2, 3. (28)
In other terms, the uniform membrane measurement e{1}{2}{3} is
isomorphic to the measurement of an non-degenerate observable
A, in a three-dimensional complex Hilbert space H3, if we
represent the quantum state vector |ψ⟩ = √x1eiα1 |a1⟩ +√
x2eiα2 |a2⟩+√x3eiα3 |a3⟩ ∈ H3, by a vector x = x1xˆ1+x2xˆ2+x3xˆ3,
whose components are precisely the transition probabilities (see
Section 2).
The N = 3 degenerate case, with two outcomes
Aswepreviouslymentioned, other typologies ofmeasurements
are possible with a two-dimensional membrane, that we have
denoted e{1,2}{3}, e{1,3}{2} and e{2,3}{1}. Let us consider e{1,2}{3},
the description of the other two measurements being similar. A
measurement e{1,2}{3} corresponds to an experimental situation
such that the experimenter decides not to discriminate between
the two outcomes xˆ1 and xˆ2 (degeneratemeasurement). Therefore,
the measurement only has two possible outcomes. To perform
e{1,2}{3}, the experimenter proceeds as follows. Once s/he has
applied the uniform breakable membrane on S2, s/he adds a highly
reactive substance along the common boundary between A1 and
A2. The effect of this special substance is twofold: (1) it produces
the effective fusion of the two regions in a single region A{1,2} =
A1 ∪ A2, in the sense that if the membrane breaks in a point
belonging, say, to A1, the tearing now propagates also across
the boundary with A2 (because of the presence of the reactive
substance), causing the collapse of the entire region A{1,2}; (2) itcauses the detachment of the common anchor point xˆ3 before the
other two anchor points xˆ1 and xˆ2.
Thismeans that, prior to the final detachment of the two anchor
points xˆ1 and xˆ2, because of the advanced detachment of anchor
point xˆ3, the contraction of the elastic membrane will cause the
particle to be drawn to point (see Fig. 5):
x{1,2} = x1x1 + x2 xˆ1 +
x2
x1 + x2 xˆ2. (29)
Then, also the remaining two anchor points xˆ1 and xˆ2 detach,
and we assume they do so almost simultaneously, so that the
membrane contracts toward the particle, without affecting its
acquired position x{1,2}, which therefore constitutes its final state,
i.e., the outcome of the measurement. On the other hand, if the
membrane breaks in A3, then only that region collapses, producing
the final outcome xˆ3 (as in the e{1}{2}{3} measurement). So, when
performing e{1,2}{3}, we have only two possible transitions: x →
x{1,2} and x→ xˆ3, and the associated probabilities are:
P(x→ x{1,2}) = µL(A{1,2})
µL(S2)
= x1 + x2,
P(x→ xˆ3) = µL(A3)
µL(S2)
= x3.
(30)
In other terms, the measurement e{1,2}{3} is isomorphic to the
measurement of a degenerate three-dimensional observable A =
a{1,2}(P1 + P2) + a3P3, with Pi = |ai⟩⟨ai|, i = 1, 2, 3, where the
possible post-measurement states are |ψ{1,2}⟩ =

x1
x1+x2 e
iα1 |a1⟩ +
x2
x1+x2 e
iα2 |a2⟩ and |a3⟩, and are represented by vectors x{1,2} and
xˆ3, in S2, respectively. And similarly – mutatis mutandis – for the
measurements e{1,3}{2} and e{2,3}{1}.
The general N-outcome case
It is straightforward to generalize the working of the UTR-
model to the case of an arbitrary number N of outcomes. The
material point particle then lives in Rn, with n ≥ N , and to
perform a (non-degenerate) measurement e{1}···{N}, a uniform and
breakable (N − 1)-dimensional hypermembrane is stretched over
the hypersurface SN−1 of a (N−1)-dimensional simplex generated
by N orthonormal vectors xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , and attached to its N vertex
points. Once the hypermembrane is in place, the particle, by
moving deterministically toward it (along a trajectory that is not
important here to specify, which will depend on the structure of
the state space; see the discussion at the end of Section 7, for the
case of a Hilbertian state space), sticks to it at a particular point:
x =

i∈IN
xixˆi,

i∈IN
xi = 1, IN ≡ {1, . . . ,N}, (31)
which defines the state of the particle on the hypermembrane.
This gives rise toN ‘‘tension lines’’, connecting x to the different
vertex points xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , defining in this way N disjoint regions
Ai, such that SN = ∪i∈IN Ai (Ai is the convex closure of {xˆ1, . . . ,
xˆi−1, x, xˆi+1, . . . , xˆN}). Then, after some time the hypermembrane
breaks, at some point λ = i∈IN λixˆi,i∈IN λi = 1. If λ ∈ Ai, for
60 D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75Fig. 4. The breaking of the elastic membrane (in gray color) in a e{1}{2}{3} measurement proceeds in two steps: first the membrane collapses, within the boundaries of the
convex region containing the initial breaking point (here A1), then, as soon as it loses the anchor points associated with this region, it shrinks toward the remaining anchor
point, bringing with it the point particle (here to position xˆ1).Fig. 5. The breaking of the elastic membrane (in gray color), when the two regions A1 and A2 are fused into a single region A{1,2} , during a e{1,2}{3} measurement. Here the
process is represented in the case where the initial breaking point is in A2 . Firstly, the membrane in A{1,2} collapses, causing the common anchor point xˆ3 to detach and
the particle to be drawn to position x{1,2}; then, also the two anchor points xˆ1 and xˆ2 detach, simultaneously, causing the membrane to shrink toward the particle, without
affecting its acquired position.a given i ∈ IN , then Ai collapses, causing its N − 1 anchor points
xˆj, j ≠ i, to tear away. So, if λ ∈ Ai, the elastic hypermembrane
contracts toward point xˆi, that is, toward the only point at which
it remained attached, pulling in this way the particle into that
position. In other terms, the process produces the transition x →
xˆi, and the probability of such process is P(x → xˆi) = µL(Ai)µL(SN−1) .
Generalizing the previous reasoning for the three-outcome case
(see Appendix A), one can show that, for all i ∈ IN :
P(x→ xˆi) = µL(Ai)
µL(SN−1)
= xi, (32)
showing that the measurement e{1}···{N} is isomorphic to the mea-
surement of an non-degenerate observable (1), in aN-dimensionalcomplex Hilbert spaceHN , if we represent the quantum state vec-
tor (2) by the vector (31),whose components are precisely the tran-
sition probabilities (32).
We now also consider the more general class of measurements
eIM1 ···IMn , n = 1, . . . ,N , corresponding to situations where we
have n different subsets IMk of IN , k = 1, . . . , n,
n
k=1 Mk = N ,
so that for each k, all regions Ai having their indices in IMk are fused
together, and form a single structure AIMk = ∪i∈IMk Ai. In accor-
dance with our previous description, the practical fusion of these
regions is realized through the application of a special reactive
substance at their common boundaries, so that the entire region
AIMk collapses, whenever a breaking point manifests in one of its
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points shared by these subregions, causing the particle to be drawn
by the elastic hypermembrane to position:
xIMk =

i∈IMk
 xi
i∈IMk xi
 xˆi, (33)
and subsequently, because of the further simultaneous detach-
ment of the remaining anchor points, the entire hypermembrane
shrinks in the direction of the particle, without affecting its ac-
quired position xIMk . For a general eIM1 ···IMn -measurement, we thus
have n different possible outcomes (1 ≤ n ≤ N), associated with
the n points xIMk , k = 1, . . . , n, and the transition probabilities
are:
P(x→ xIMk ) =
µL(AIMk )
µL(SN−1)
=

i∈IMk
xi. (34)
In view of (9), a measurement eIM1 ···IMn is therefore isomor-
phic to that associated with a degenerate observable (6), in a
N-dimensional complex Hilbert space HN , where the possible
post-measurement states are given by (7), and are represented in
RN by the n vectors (33). For n = 1, we have a single outcome, and
the experiment is trivial, whereas for n = N we recover the special
case of the measurement e{1}···{N}, isomorphic to a non-degenerate
observable (1).
A psychological mechanism
Before proceeding to the next section, where the UTR-model
will be used to discuss the phenomenon of entanglement, it is im-
portant to spend a few more words on the membrane mechanism
that we have described. The reader may indeed wonder what are
the reasons behind our choice of using, as a specific realization
of the measurement process, the dynamics of a breakable elastic
membrane. Why should one be interested in such particular real-
ization, and can one find a simpler representation for the probabil-
ities? Also, is themodel compatible withwhat we intuitively know
about the functioning of a human cognitive process?
In that respect, the important question to ask is the following: Is
it possible to derive the quantum probabilities in terms of a consis-
tent mechanism, able to describe general measurements, possibly
degenerate, having an arbitrary number of outcomes? In this arti-
cle, and in its second part (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a), we
show that such a mechanical model can be constructed in terms
of elastic breakable membranes (or better, hypermembranes), and
this is per se already an interesting and unexpected result. How-
ever, is the dynamics of the membrane the only one that can be
used to represent the unfolding of a quantum (or quantum-like)
measurement process? Do we have fundamental reasons for the
utilization of membranes, instead of other systems?
Here it is important to distinguish two different levels in the
modelization. The first one is the choice of the geometric structure
of the simplexes. This is really the fundamental part, as is clear
that simplexes are the natural mathematical objects to be used
to represent quantities, like probabilities, that sum to 1. In other
terms, all possible probabilities associated with an experiment
with N possible outcomes will naturally fill a (N − 1)-dimensional
simplex. The second level, less fundamental, is the description
of a mechanism that can explain how a point on such simplex,
representing the state of the system under investigation, canmove
from that position to one of its possible final states, which in
the case of non-degenerate measurements are the N vertices of
the simplex. In that respect, our description of the dynamics of
a breaking membrane can certainly be replaced, in principle, by
some other descriptions. However, it is essential for the adoptedmechanism to take into account the fact that the size (the Lebesgue
measure) of the subregions formed by the on-membrane point
particle, representative of the state, must be proportional to the
probabilities of the different outcomes. The mechanism of the
breaking membrane takes this fact into account in a very simple
and naturalway, andwe have not been able to imagine any simpler
description.
It should also be observed that the abstract breaking mech-
anism of the membrane is in fact very general and also a good
metaphor ofwhatwe humans can intuitively feel when confronted
with decisional contexts. In other terms, the membrane mecha-
nism can certainly also be understood as a representation of an in-
ner psychological mechanism. We can in fact consider that when
a human subject is confronted with a question (and more gener-
ally with a decision), and an associated set of N possible answers,
this will automatically build a mental (neural) state of equilib-
rium,which results from the balancing of the different tensions be-
tween the initial state of the concept subjected to the question, and
the available mutually excluding answers that compete with each
other. The elastic membrane can then be seen as a convenient way
to give shape to such a mental state of equilibrium, characterized
by the presence of competing ‘‘tension lines’’ going from the spe-
cific position of the point particle on themembrane, representative
of the initial state, to the N vertices of the simplex, representative
of the different possible answers.
Still in accordance with what we can subjectively perceive, at
some moment this mental equilibrium will be disturbed, in a non-
predictableway, and the disturbancewill cause an irreversible pro-
cess during which, very quickly, the initial conceptual state will
be drawn to one of the possible answers. This is represented in
the model by the random breaking point on the membrane, which
by collapsing also breaks the tensional equilibrium that had previ-
ously been built. This tension-reduction process, however, will not
always result in a full resolution of the conflict between all the
competing answers. There are contexts such that the state of the
system can be brought into another state of equilibrium, between
a reduced set of possibilities. These sub-equilibriums are repre-
sented in our model by the different possible lower-dimensional
sub-simplexes of the (N − 1)-dimensional simplex, and describe
those outcomes of degenerate measurements associated with de-
generate eigenvalues.
Having said this, we conclude this section by remarking that the
tension lines giving rise to the different convex regions of themem-
brane, are all formed by indeterministic hidden-measurement in-
teractions, that is, by pure measurements giving rise to conditions
of unstable equilibrium. It is interesting to note that it is the very
existence of these indeterministic pure measurements that cre-
ates the different possibilities. On the other hand, the probability
associated with these different possibilities, or outcomes, do not
directly depend on these indeterministic pure measurements, but
on the deterministic ones, which are contained inside the convex
regions. This because, as already emphasized, the pure measure-
ments associated with the ‘‘tension lines’’ are of zero measure, and
cannot contribute to the value of the different probabilities. So, to
put it in a different way, the tensions building the mental mem-
brane’s equilibrium are associated with unstable, indeterministic
processes; these processes are at the origin of the different possi-
bilities, but not of the values of the probabilities associated with
them.
4. Entanglement in the UTR-model
In this section,we exploit the UTR-model representation to gain
some insight into the phenomenon of entanglement. In Section 2
we have considered the example of a compound system made of
two entities, which can either be in a product (non-entangled)
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UTR-model measurements with up to four different possible outcomes. One can
see that the particle immersed in the volume of the tetrahedron defines four
different convex regions (indicated with clear dashed lines), each one opposed to a
different vertex of the volume, corresponding to the four outcomes of the e{1}{2}{3}{4}
measurement. In the picture the two states x{1,2} and x{3,4} , corresponding to the
two possible outcomes of the (one-entity, degenerate) measurement e{1,2}{3,4} , as
well as the two states x{1,3} and x{2,4} , corresponding to the two possible outcomes
of the (one-entity, degenerate) measurement e{1,3}{2,4} , are also represented.
or non-product (entangled) state, and we have shown that the
difference between non-entangled and entangled states is that
for the former the probability for the outcome of a coincident
product measurement on the entity consisting of the compound of
both entities, associated with an observable of the tensor product
form A1 ⊗ A2, is equal to the product of the probabilities of
these outcomes when the same two measurements are conducted
separately on each entity, by means of the observables A1 ⊗ I and
I⊗ A2, whereas for the latter this can never be the case.
In the UTR-model, a four-outcome system can still be fully vi-
sualized, exploiting the fact that a three-dimensional hypermem-
brane S3 can be represented in R3 as the volume of a tetrahedron
(see Fig. 6). Following the notation of Section 2,wehave that amea-
surement A1 ⊗ I on the first entity corresponds in the UTR-model
to a measurement e{1,2}{3,4}, and a measurement I⊗ A2 on the sec-
ond entity to a measurement e{1,3}{2,4}. It is interesting to observe
that when we perform these measurements one after the other, in
whatever order, we obtain exactly the same result of the jointmea-
surement e{1}{2}{3}{4}, compatiblywith the fact that A1⊗I and I⊗A2
commute.
To see this, let us assume that we have performed first, say,
e{1,3}{2,4}. The outcome x{1,3} can then be obtained with probability
x1+x3, whereas the outcome x{2,4} canbe obtainedwith probability
x2 + x4. Assuming for instance that we have obtained x{1,3}, a
further measurement e{1,2}{3,4} will then produce either outcome
xˆ1, with probability x1x1+x3 , or outcome xˆ3, with probability
x3
x1+x3 .
Therefore, the probability that two sequential measurements give
outcome xˆ1 is given by the product (x1 + x3)( x1x1+x3 ) = x1, and
in the same way the probability that two sequential measurement
give outcome xˆ3 is (x1 + x3)( x3x1+x3 ) = x3. Reasoning in a similar
way, if we assume that e{1,3}{2,4} has yielded instead x{2,4}, a further
measurement e{1,2}{3,4} will now produce either outcome xˆ2, with
probability x2x2+x4 , or outcome xˆ4, with probability
x4
x2+x4 , so that the
probabilities to obtain xˆ2 or xˆ4 in the sequential measurement are
(x2+ x4)( x2x2+x4 ) = x2 and (x2+ x4)(
x4
x2+x4 ) = x4, respectively. And
of course the same holds true if we perform first e{1,2}{3,4}, and then
e{1,3}{2,4}.
What we have just shown is that in the UTR-model, isomor-
phically to what happens in the quantum Hilbertian formalism,when we perform two different but compatible (i.e., commutable)
‘‘coarse-grained’’ measurements, one after the other, we obtain
a ‘‘finer grained’’ measurement, where a greater number of out-
comes can be distinguished. Now, since the two measurements
e{1,2}{3,4} and e{1,3}{2,4} only have two outcomes, they can also be
described, individually, using a one-dimensional elastic structure,
instead of a three-dimensional one. For instance, the measure-
ment e{1,3}{2,4}, performed on a particle in state x by means of a
three-dimensional hypermembrane (represented in Fig. 6 as an
elastic ‘‘gel’’ filling the volume of a tetrahedron), is isomorphic to
a measurement performed using a one-dimensional elastic band,
stretched over the two points x{1,3} and x{2,4}, as is clear that x can
also bewritten as x = (x1+x3)x{1,3}+(x2+x4)x{2,4}, and similarly,
the measurement e{1,2}{3,4} is isomorphic to a measurement using
a one-dimensional elastic stretched over the two points x{1,2} and
x{3,4}, as is clear that we can also write x = (x1 + x2)x{1,2} + (x3 +
x4)x{3,4}.
However, it is not possible to use two one-dimensional elastic
band measurements, in sequence, to mimic the effects of a three-
dimensional structure. Certainly, in the special case of an entity in
a product state, one can always consider the two entities forming
the compound system separately, each one represented in its own
one-dimensional simplex, and perform separate measurements
on each of them, then combine the probabilities for the different
outcomes to deduce those associated with a joint measurement.
But this cannot be done if the two-entity system is in an entangled
state, as only a genuinely three-dimensional structure will be able
to account for all the experimental possibilities. In other terms,
apart special (trivial) cases, it will not be possible to combine
two one-dimensional elastic bands, say inside the structure of a
tetrahedron, to reproduce the effects of the two measurements
e{1,2}{3,4} and e{1,3}{2,4} performed in sequence, i.e., the effects of the
‘‘fine-grained’’ measurement e{1}{2}{3}{4}.
This means that higher dimensional structures can reproduce
the behavior of lower dimensional ones, when (degenerate) sub-
measurements are considered, but the converse is not true. This
is an expression of what is called emergence: when we combine
two microscopic entities, like two electrons, in an entangled state,
a genuine new entity emerges, which cannot be described in terms
of the properties of the sub-entities forming the pair. Similarly,
when two concepts are combined, a genuine newconcept emerges,
which cannot be understood only in terms of the two individual
concepts of which it is the combination.
Consider the following example, taken from Aerts and Sozzo
(2011), and further analyzed in Aerts and Sozzo (2012a). The first
entity is the concept Animal, and a measurement of it consists
in asking a subject to choose between the animal being a Horse
or a Bear. This means that the concept Animal is considered as
a two-state system, and the above question is equivalent to an
experiment performed with a one-dimensional elastic, with the
two possible outcomes {H, B}. The second entity is the concept
Acts, and a measurement of it consists in asking a subject to
choose between the act being either the emission of sounds like
Growls, or likeWhinnies. This means that the concept Acts is again
considered as a two-state system, and the question is equivalent
to an experiment performedwith another one-dimensional elastic,
with the two possible outcomes {G,W }.
Consider then the compound system formed by both entities,
in the state defined by their conceptual combination The Animal
Acts. This time we consider a joint measurement on both entities,
which is about asking a subject to choose between the following
four possibilities: The Horse Growls, The Horse Whinnies, The Bear
Growls and The Bear Whinnies. This means that the two-concept
system is a four-state system, and that the above question is
equivalent to an experiment performed with a three-dimensional
elastic hypermembrane (or a three-dimensional elastic ‘‘gel’’, in
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HG,HW , BG and BW . When data of the above three different
measurements are collected (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011), one finds that
the probabilities do not obey relations (26), which means that the
compound system formed by the two conceptual entities Animal
and Acts, when in the state defined by the conceptual combination
The Animal Acts, is not in a product state, but in an entangled one.
The entanglement of the two concepts is an expression of their
connection through meaning. When a subject connects through
meaning Animal and Acts, s/he does so in a way that when, af-
terwards, s/he considers exemplars of the combination The An-
imal Acts, s/he will not refer back in a simple, combinatorial,
‘‘logico-classical’’ way to the exemplars of the individual concepts
Animal and Acts. To express this in terms of the UTR-model anal-
ogy, s/he will not simply stretch a one-dimensional elastic over
the Horse and Bear end points, and represent the state of Ani-
mal as a point particle on it, and then do the same for the state
of Acts, which would correspond to another point particle on
another one-dimensional elastic, stretched over the end points
Growls andWhinnies. This type of ‘‘parallel one-dimensional oper-
ations’’ would be justified only if the two-concept system would
be in a product state, corresponding to a situation where the
concepts are combined without the creative emergent power of
the human mind coming into play. Instead, what a human mind
does, is to really build the equivalent of a three-dimensional elas-
tic structure, and put the four different possible combinations
{HG,HW , BG, BW } as the four end-points of it (the four end points
of a tetrahedron). By doing so, it attributes new weights to them,
as ‘‘good examples of’’ The Animal Acts. These newweights are cer-
tainly related, in some way, to the old weights (those associated
with the individual concepts, i.e., which can be described by one-
dimensional elastic structures), but cannot bederived from them in
a simple combinatorial way. Indeed, all the experience of the sub-
ject, in her/his life, as regards to animals and the sounds theymake,
comes into play in the determination of these new weights. This is
a deep emergent creative process, expression of a dramatic change
of the measurement context, whose increased level of potentiality
needs additional dimensions to be described. A fact that is fully ev-
idenced in the UTR-model, in the different possibilities offered by
three-dimensional structures, in comparison to one-dimensional
ones.
5. Representing the probabilities of a single measurement
In the previous sections we have described the UTR-model by
means of one of its possible mechanical realizations, which uses
uniform hypermembranes that by breaking are able to draw a
material point particle either to one of the N vertices of a (N − 1)-
dimensional simplex SN−1 (in case of a non-degenerate measure-
ment), or to a point belonging to one of the lower dimensional
sub-simplexes forming SN−1 (in case of a degenerate measure-
ment). We have described the model mostly as a tool to represent
quantum probabilities and understand how they emerge in a typi-
cal quantummeasurement, showing that a quantummeasurement
can be understood as an experiment involving a uniform mixture
of potential pure measurements. These pure measurements are al-
most classical, in the sense that, given the state of the point particle,
almost all of them can be deterministically associated with a sin-
gle outcome. However, since it is beyond the control power of the
experimenter to know which specific pure measurement is each
time actualized, outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic
terms.
In other terms, the UTR-model is a model with a built-in mech-
anism able to explain the origin of quantum probabilities as the re-
sult of a uniform mixture of (hidden) pure measurements, whichare available to be selected in a given experimental context, but
in the ambit of a protocol which does not allow the experimenter
to take any form of control over the selection mechanism (Aerts,
1986, 1998, 1999b; Coecke, 1995; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013a). How-
ever, as we alreadymentioned, and as was noticedmany years ago
by one of us, this hidden-measurement approach is in fact an uni-
versal approach, in the sense that probabilities of whatever ori-
gin can always be explained and represented as being due to the
presence of a lack of knowledge about the interaction between the
experimental apparatus and the entity (Aerts, 1994). Of course,
considering the correspondence thatwe have highlighted between
the probabilities described in the UTR-model, in terms of the
uniform Lebesgue measure, and those of orthodox quantum me-
chanics, described by the Born rule, it is clear that also the Hilbert-
model, with its scalar product, has to be considered a universal
model for representing arbitrary probabilities appearing in nature,
in a given measurement context.
In other terms, the UTR-model, and equally so the Hilbert-
model, are mathematical structures which can be used to repre-
sent in principle any probabilities emerging from the interaction
of two physical entities (the system under observation and the sys-
tem which performs the observation). This is true, however, only
if we consider a single measurement situation. Indeed, if different
measurements are considered, in a sequential process, the situa-
tion becomes much more complex and a more general framework
is needed to describe the different probability models that can
emerge from the interactions. This more general framework will
be presented and analyzed in the next two sections of the article.
For the moment, and considering our previous analysis, we
can state the following representation theorem, valid for a single
measurement situation (Aerts & Sozzo, 2012a,b):
Representation theorem. Given an arbitrary entity (e.g., a phys-
ical entity, or a conceptual entity) in a given state, and given a
measurement, performed on it by means of another entity (e.g., a
macroscopic measuring apparatus, or a human mind), with a set
of possible outcomes {o1, . . . , ok}, with associated probabilities
{p1, . . . , pk}, p1 + · · · + pk = 1, k ∈ N (obtained as the limits of
the relative frequency of the respective outcomes), then it is always
possible to work out a representation of this experimental situation
either in RN , by means of the UTR − model, with the probabilities
given by the Lebesgue measure of appropriately defined subregions
of a (N − 1)-simplex, or in a Hilbert spaceHN ≡ CN , with the proba-
bilities given by the Born rule of standard quantum theory, with N an
integer greater or equal to k.
It is important to emphasize that although both the UTR-
model and the Hilbert-model allow to universally represent a
given single measurement situation, these two representations
are certainly not equivalent. The advantage of the Hilbert-space
representation is that it uses a manifest linear structure, which
is particularly useful when one wants to see how probabilities
associated with different states of the entity are related to each
other, and describes these relations in terms of interference effects
(Aerts & Sozzo, 2012b). On the other hand, the advantage of the
real-space representation of the UTR-model is that it does not
assume linearity for the state space (a simplex is not a linear
space), and therefore, from that point of view, it is a more general
representation than the Hilbertian one. For instance, as we have
seen in Section 4, the real-space representation of the UTR-model
allows to identify and describe measurements on entangled states
without the need of linearity (Aerts & Sozzo, 2012a). The UTR-
model is a more general representation also because it allows for a
finer description of the measurement process. Indeed, not only the
state x of the entity prior to themeasurement, and its final possible
64 D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75Fig. 7. A pure measurement represented in (a) as a point λ in the 1-dimensional simplex generated by the final states of the measured entity, with the region B1 (resp. B2)
corresponding to those initial states that are all changed by the interaction into the final state xˆ1 (resp. xˆ2). In (b) the same pure measurement is represented as a point λ˜ in
the 1-dimensional simplex generated by the final states of the measuring entity, with the region A1 (resp. A2) corresponding to those initial states of the point particle that
change the state of the measuring entity into the final state λˆ1 (resp. λˆ2).states2 xˆi, are represented in themodel, but also the statesλ of the
measuring system, i.e., the puremeasurementswhich are available
to be actualized.
In the interpretation of the UTR-model that we have proposed
in the previous sections, we have considered that the state of the
system is given, i.e., that the system is in a pure state (specified
by the vector x), and that we are in the presence of a uniform
mixture of pure measurements (specified by the equipotential λ
in the simplex SN−1, i.e., by all the potential breaking points of the
uniformhypermembrane). It is however interesting to observe that
themodel also allows for a symmetrical interpretation, in the sense
that one can consider that only a singlemeasurement interaction is
available (a singleλ), whereas the state of the systemwould not be
a priori given, but described by a uniformmixture. This is of course
a very different dynamical picture.
In our physical realization, it would correspond to the situation
where the elastic hypermembrane, instead of being uniform, can
only break in a single point λ, and the experimenter, when
applying the hypermembrane, has no possibility to know which
will be the position of the point particle when sticking on it.
For instance, one can assume that the particle would move so
erratically that one could only predict such position in probabilistic
terms, by means of a uniform probability density. In the ambit
of a cognitive experiment with human subjects, we can think for
instance of a situation where participants are asked to respond
to a certain question in a deterministic way (according to some
predetermined rule), but with the context of the question which
is each time randomly changed, according to some uniform
probability distribution.
It is important here not to confuse a ‘mixture of states’ with
a ‘superposition of states,’ as described in the linear Hilbert
space model of quantum mechanics. Indeed, it is customary to
affirm that, immediately before asking an experimental question,
a quantum entity can be in an indefinite state, described by
a superposition. This superposition, however, describes in the
quantum formalism a superposition of final possible states of the
entity (the outcomes), and cannot in general be interpreted as a
statistical mixture. In what we are considering here, the mixture
of states refers to a mixture of initial states, in the sense that the
experimenter, when performing the measurement, is not able to
2 In our mechanical realization of the UTR-model, the outcomes of the
measurements also correspond to states of the point particle. However, in a more
abstract understanding of the model, it is not necessary to equate outcomes and
states of the entity, in the sense that the model can be used also to represent
situations where the state after the measurement cannot be necessarily identified.control, and therefore to know, which is the initial state of the
entity. Therefore, even though s/he knows that the only available
pure measurement produces (almost all the times) a final state in
a perfectly deterministic way, s/he is unable to predict such final
state, as s/he lacks knowledge about the initial condition of the
measurement process.
One can also interpret this situation in a reversed way, by
considering that it is not the elastic hypermembrane which
measures the state of the point particle, but the (now erratically
moving) point particle which measures the ‘‘breakability’’ state
of the hypermembrane. From that inverted viewpoint, the final
positions of the point particle are to be interpreted as the final
states of the hypermembrane. Themathematical description of this
symmetric, complementary view of the UTR-model can be easily
deduced by answering the following question:What are the points
of SN−1 representing the possible states of the particle that are all
dragged to a same final state (outcome), when only a single pure
measurement λ is available, i.e., when the hypermembrane can
only break in a single point λ?
For N = 2, it is easy to see in Fig. 7 (a) that all states x of the
particle belonging to region B2, bounded by vectors xˆ2 and λ, will
be drawn to xˆ2, whereas all states belonging to region B1, bounded
by vectors λ and xˆ1, will be drawn to xˆ1. Therefore, the probabil-
ity for a point particle whose initial position is uniformly randomly
chosen, to be drawn to xˆ1, is P(→ xˆ1) = µL(B1)µL(S1) = λ2, whereas the
probability to be drawn to xˆ2, is P(→ xˆ2) = µL(B2)µL(S1) = λ1. To make
fully manifest the connection with the Born rule of quantum me-
chanics, also in this complementary view, one has to work directly
in the ‘‘state of the apparatus’’ representation, instead of the ‘‘state
of the entity’’ representation, by setting λ˜1 = λ2 and λ˜2 = λ1,
so that the probabilities become (see Fig. 7(b)): P(λ˜ → λˆi) =
µL(Ai)
µL(S1)
= λ˜i, i = 1, 2. Then, the Hilbert-model representation of
these same probabilities can be obtained bymeans of the Born rule
if one considers a state vector |φ⟩ =

λ˜1eiβ1 |b1⟩ +

λ˜2eiβ2 |b2⟩ ∈
H2, which now describes the state of themeasuring entity, instead
of the state of the measured one.
The above alternative scheme, which can be generalized to an
arbitrary number N of outcomes (see Appendix B, for the N = 3
case), highlights an interesting symmetry between the pure states
of themeasuring entity and the pure states of themeasured entity.
This symmetry tells us that probabilities associated with a given,
singlemeasurement situation, can be described by either assuming
that the state of the system is perfectly known, and the potentials
acting on the system are the result of a uniform mixture of pure
measurements, or by assuming that the state of the measuring
system is perfectly known, and the potentials are the result of
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that the quantum mechanical Born rule is compatible, from a
mathematical viewpoint, with both situations (in the ambit of a
single measurement situation).
In the next section we will explore more deeply the nature
of the potentiality which emerges from the contact between the
observer and the observed, but to do so we first need to introduce
an even more general model than the UTR-model, or the Hilbert-
model. This will allow us to introduce the important notion of
universal measurement.
6. Averaging over non-uniform fluctuations
In the previous sections we have described the UTR-model
and have shown that, likewise the Hilbert-model, it can be
understood as a ‘‘universal probabilistic machine’’, in the sense
that it corresponds to a mathematical structure able to represent
every set of probabilities appearing in a given single measurement
context, whatever its nature. More specifically, what we have
done is to use a specific physical realization of the UTR-model
to highlight the structure of the hidden dynamics which is
inherent in a quantummeasurement, explaining the emergence of
probabilities as due to the presence of a ‘‘region’’ of potentiality
between the measuring and measured systems, which can either
originate from a lack of knowledge about the initial condition of
the measured system, or as a lack of knowledge about the state of
the measuring apparatus (i.e., about the pure measurement which
is each time actualized).
We want now to consider a more general class of measure-
ments. To do so, we observe that in our discussion of the UTR-
model, we have only considered uniform elastic hypermembranes,
and this is the reason why the different probabilities in the model
were obtained by means of the Lebesgue measure. In other terms,
so far we have implicitly considered that each hypermembrane is
characterized by a uniform probability density ρu, describing how
the elastic can break. But of course, we can imagine hypermem-
branes that can break in a variety of different ways, depending on
how they have been manufactured and on the nature of the en-
vironment in which they are immersed. This amounts assuming
that each elastic structure is characterized by a more general, not
necessarily uniform, probability density ρ : SN−1 → [0,∞[, de-
scribing the probabilities for the hypermembrane of breaking in
the different regions of SN−1. Accordingly, the probability P(A|ρ)
for a ρ-hypermembrane (i.e., an hypermembrane characterized by
the probability density ρ) to break in a given region A of SN−1,
is now given by the integral P(A|ρ) = A ρ(y)dy, which corre-
sponds to the Lebesgue measure of A only in the case ρ would be
uniform. Therefore, the different transition probabilities are now
conditional to the specific choice of the ρ-hypermembrane used to
perform the measurement, i.e.,
P(x→ xˆi|ρ) = P(Ai|ρ) =

Ai
ρ(y)dy, i ∈ IN . (35)
Clearly, similarly to the UTR-model, this more general descrip-
tion of a measurement, which we shall call the general tension-
reduction (GTR) model, also allows for a full visualization of what
goes on during the measurement process, in terms of the collapse
of breakable structures, and the same discussion presented in Sec-
tions 3 and 4 can be repeated for non-uniform hypermembranes
(i.e., non-uniform ρ). In other terms, uniform and non-uniform
hypermembranes exemplify the same measurement paradigm,
which is that of the hidden-measurement approach (Aerts, 1986,
1998, 1999b; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013a), where the emergence of
quantum and quantum-like processes is explained as the conse-
quence of the presence of fluctuations in the measurement con-
text. But, as we said, the interest of the GTR-model, in comparisonto the (uniform) UTR-model, is in its ability of providing a much
more general theoretical framework, able to describe different ty-
pologies ofmeasurements, characterized by different forms of fluc-
tuations, which can give rise to different probability models (as we
will demonstrate in a very explicit way in the following section, in
the two-outcome situation).
For instance, in the two-outcome case, the GTR-model allows
for the description of elastic bands which can uniformly break
only in their central segment (the so-called ϵ-model), a situation
which can give rise to non-Kolmogorovian and non-Hilbertian
probability models (Aerts, 1986, 1995; Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014a), and if we let the length of such segment tends to zero,
we find the special case of a probability density which is a Dirac
delta-distribution ρ(z) = δ(z), describing a situation where only
a single deterministic interaction (what we have called a pure
measurement) would be available to be selected. This means that
one can know in advance where exactly the elastic will break, with
certainty, and outcomes can be described by probabilities which
can only take the values 1 or 0 (if we exclude the special case of a
particle situated exactly on the breaking point), depending only on
the initial state of the system.
In a cognitive experiment, this would correspond to a situation
where all the subjects would give the same fully predictable
answers to the questions addressed to them, for example because
they would have decided in advance to respond to them on the
basis of a predetermined script. Since no genuine potentiality is
involved in (almost) deterministic measurements of this kind, we
can say that they maximize the discovery aspect, as they can only
reveal what was already present (actual) before the execution of
the measurement.3
Somehow opposite to (almost) deterministic pure measure-
ments, maximizing the discovery aspect, the GTR-model is also
able to describe what we may call ‘‘solipsistic measurements’’,
maximizing the creation aspect. As a simple example, consider a
measurement carried out with an elastic whose breakability is de-
scribed by a double-Dirac distribution: ρ(z) = aδ(z− 1√
2
)+bδ(z+
1√
2
), a+b = 1, a, b > 0. This describes a situationwhere the elastic
can only break in its two end points, so that the probabilities of the
two outcomes will not depend anymore on the specific state of the
point particle. In other terms, we are here in a situation where the
measurement reveals nothing about the state of the entity before
the experiment, as is clear that only the structure of the hidden in-
teractions is important to determine the value of the probabilities
(hence the term ‘‘solipsistic’’ used to denote these experiments, to
emphasize that they only tell us about the state of the observer,
i.e., of the measuring apparatus, and not about the state of the ob-
served system).
Therefore, we can say that, opposite to deterministic measure-
ments, solipsistic measurements minimize the discovery aspect
and maximize the creation aspect. In a cognitive experiment, this
could correspond to a situation where the subjects are totally in-
sensitive to the way the questions are formulated, and respond to
them in a genuinely unpredictable way, according only to the fluc-
tuations of their state of mind. In other terms, in a pure solipsistic
measurement the subjects would not be affected by the context
3 During a deterministic measurement the system will undergo, in general, a
transition from an initial to a final state. Therefore, we can certainly affirm that the
measurement creates a new state. However, since the process is fully predictable,
we cannot consider this process as a process of actualization of a potential property.
It is only when some level of potentiality is actualized during an experiment,
in a genuinely unpredictable way, that we can speak of the creation of a new
property, and therefore affirm that there is an element of creation involved in the
measurement (Sassoli de Bianchi, 2015).
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tions, so that their answers cannot reveal anything about the na-
ture of the questions, but only about the nature of their state of
mind at that moment. In that sense, we could say that solipsistic
measurements can possibly modelize behaviors of subjects who,
for whatever reasons, would understand language only at a very
basic level (involving vocabulary and spelling, thus allowing them
to respond to the questions), but with difficulties in grasping more
complex language structures, such as the symbolic and figurative
contents.
In between these two extremes, describing on one side mea-
surements maximizing the discovery aspect, and on the other side
measurements maximizing the creation aspect, all possible inter-
mediary situations, mixing these two aspects in infinitely many
different combinations, are possible and describable within the
GTR-model. This because there are no specific restrictions in the
choices of the probability density ρ, which only needs to be an in-
tegrable function, and therefore can also be discontinuous, and in-
clude the limit case of distributions. In other terms, the model is
very general, as it includes pure classic measurements and pure
solipsistic measurements, with the pure quantum measurements
somewhere in between, as well as all possible quantum-like mea-
surements described by probability models which are different
from the classical, quantum and solipsistic ones, thus correspond-
ing to truly intermediary situations.
Now, considering the existence of all these different possible
regimes of creation and discovery, corresponding to different
degrees of availability of the hidden deterministic interactions
that can be selected during a measurement and produce a
specific outcome, it is natural to consider a more general class
of measurements, which we denote universal measurements, such
that not only a hidden interactionwould be actualized during their
execution, i.e., a given breaking point of the elastic structure, but an
entire probability law ρ, from which a given breaking point would
then be obtained.
To put it differently, a universal measurement euniv ≡ {eρ} is
a meta-measurement where, at each measure, an entire measure-
ment eρ , characterized by a probability densityρ, is actualized (in a
randomly uniform way) and carried out. To put it even differently,
a universal measurement describes a situation of very deep lack of
knowledge regarding the experiment which is each time carried
out, as it does not only describe a situation of lack of knowledge
regarding the deterministic interaction which is actualized to pro-
duce the outcome, but also a situation of lack of knowledge regard-
ing the very typology of experiment which is conducted, i.e., about
the ρ that characterizes it. Aswe discussed in the introduction, this
is the kind of situation which risks to be the typical one in cogni-
tive experiments performedwith different subjects, as their differ-
ent ‘‘ways of choosing’’ are usually not discriminated, but averaged
out in the final statistics of outcomes.
But how can we define a uniform randomization over the
different possible probability densities? A possibility would be
that of introducing a parameterization of the probability density
ρ, by means of a finite set of parameters ϵi, i = 1, . . . , n, then
calculating the averages of the outcome probabilities over these
parameters (performing a multiple integral over them), which
would then correspond to the probabilities associated with a
hypothetical universal measurement. The problem with this kind
of strategy is that there is no natural procedure to introduce such
parameterization. For instance, in the two-outcome case, one can
certainly start by introducing a single parameter ϵ ∈ [0, 1], and the
parameterization: ρϵ(z) = 1√2ϵχ[− ϵ√2 , ϵ√2 ](z), where χ[− ϵ√2 , ϵ√2 ](z)
is the characteristic function of the interval [− ϵ√
2
, ϵ√
2
], describing
the region where the elastic is uniformly breakable (this is the
parameterization chosen in the ϵ-model). It is then not difficult to
integrate over ϵ the probabilities (35), and calculate in this wayaverage probabilities, but then why limiting the averaging only to
symmetric uniformly breakable regions?Why not considering also
asymmetric ones?
For instance, instead of a single parameter, we could introduce
two parameters ϵ1, ϵ2, with ϵ1 ∈ [0, 1] and ϵ2 ∈ [−1+ ϵ1, 1− ϵ1],
thus admittingmore general elastics, unbreakable in their left part,
from − 1√
2
to ϵ2−ϵ1√
2
, uniformly breakable from ϵ2−ϵ1√
2
to ϵ2+ϵ1√
2
, and
again unbreakable in their right part, from ϵ2+ϵ1√
2
to 1√
2
, described
by the probability densities: ρϵ1,ϵ2(z) = 1√2ϵ1 χ[ ϵ2−ϵ1√2 , ϵ2+ϵ1√2 ](z). But
then, even in this very simple case of a probability density defined
in terms of only two parameters, one immediately face a serious
problem: Bertrand’s paradox (Bertrand, 1889). Indeed, as empha-
sizedmore than a century ago by the Frenchmathematician Joseph
Bertrand, when the sample space of events is infinite, there is ap-
parently no unambiguous way to define the term ‘at random’. For
instance, considering the probabilities associated with the above
defined ρϵ1,ϵ2 , how do we have to average them, in order to de-
scribe the situation of a random choice of an elastic characterized
by a couple of parameters (ϵ1, ϵ2)? Just to give an example, we
could decide to choose the couple (ϵ1, ϵ2) at random in the trian-
gle defined by the lines ϵ1 = −ϵ2 + 1, ϵ1 = ϵ2 + 1, and ϵ1 = 0. If
we do so, we will find certain specific values for the average out-
come probabilities, but one can invent many other ways of choos-
ing (ϵ1, ϵ2) at random, thus defining different uniform averages for
the probabilities, and therefore obtain different numerical values
for them.
So, we apparently face here a double problem. (1) The first one
is that we do not seem to have any a priori criterion for deciding,
on a physical or logical basis, how many continuous variables ϵi
we should use to parameterize the probability density ρ, and how
to do it. For instance the above (ϵ1, ϵ2)-model (which generalizes
the one-parameter ϵ-model), does not allow to represent the
possibility of the previously mentioned solipsistic measurements,
which therefore would be left out from the average. (2) The second
problem, specifically related to Bertrand paradox, is that even
if we can describe a sufficiently general model, by means of a
finite number of continuous parameters ϵi, i = 1, . . . , n, which
would hypothetically be able to describe all relevantmeasurement
situations, there would still be the problem of finding a non-
ambiguous way of choosing at-random these parameters, in order
to obtain a uniform average, as infinitely many uniform averages
can a priori be defined, yielding different numerical values for the
probabilities.
This problem, which seems to prevent us from giving an
unambiguous definition, and therefore attribute a clear meaning,
to the notion of universal measurements, was already noticed by
one of us in Aerts (1998, 1999b). There, it was observed that,
despite this difficulty, there was nevertheless the possibility that
a notion of universal measurement could be defined, with a clear
physical andmathematicalmeaning. This possibilitywas indirectly
suggested by a famous theorem of quantum mechanics: Gleason’s
theorem. Indeed, being a universal measurement a measurement
consisting of a huge uniform average, over all possible parameters,
i.e., over all possible probability densities, it is certainly one of its
remarkable properties that of being characterized by probabilities
which, by definition, can only depend on the initial and final states.
But this is exactly the property of probabilities defined by means
of the Born rule! More precisely, quoting from Aerts (1998):
‘‘Gleason’s theorem states that ‘if the transition probability
depends only on the state before the measurement and on
the eigenstate of the measurement that is actualized after
the measurement, then this transition probability is equal to
the quantum transition probability’. But this Gleason property
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fore the measurement and the eigenstate that is actualized af-
ter the measurement) is exactly a property that is satisfied by
what we have called the ‘universal’ measurements. Indeed, the
transition probability of a universal measurement, by defini-
tion of this measurement, only depends on the state before
the measurement and the actualized state after the measure-
ment. Hence Gleason’s theorem shows that the transition prob-
abilities connected with universal measurements are quantum
mechanical transition probabilities. We go a step further and
want to interpret now the quantummeasurements as if they are
universal measurements. This means that quantum mechanics
is the theory that describes the probabilistics of possible out-
comes for measurements that are mixtures of all imaginable
types of measurements. Quantum mechanics is then the first-
order non classical theory. It describes the statistics that goes
along with an at-random choice between any arbitrary type
of manipulation that changes the state pv of the system un-
der study into the state pu, in such a way that we do not know
anything of the mechanism of this change of state. The only
information we have is that ‘possibly the state before the mea-
surement, namely pv , is changed into a state after the measure-
ment, namely pu’. If this is a correct explanation for quantum
statistics, it explains its success in so many regions of reality,
also concerning its numerical statistical predictions.’’
What was only conjectured in Aerts (1998), we are now in a
position to prove, thanks to a physically transparent and mathe-
matically precise definition of what a universal measurement is.
The formal proof of this result will not be given in the present ar-
ticle, but in its second part (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a), as
the main scope of the present work is to explain the functioning
of the UTR-model and introduce its non trivial GTR-model gener-
alization, so as to allow for a correct contextualization of the re-
sult of the equivalence between the universal measurements and
the measurements described by the (uniform) Lebesgue measure,
which in turn are isomorphic to the measurements described by
the Born rule (when the states describing the entity under consid-
eration admit a Hilbert space representation).
For this, we need now to give a sufficiently general and consis-
tent definition of a universal measurement, which has to include
in its average all possible measurements, but at the same time
remain well posed, in the sense that it must not suffer from
the ambiguities of typical Bertrand paradox situations, where the
randomization process is not uniquely defined. In other terms,
we need to find a general probability measure on the non-
denumerable set of N-dimensional integrable generalized func-
tions ρ, without being confronted with technical problems related
to the foundations of mathematics and probability theory. This can
be done by using the following strategy (for a demonstration of
the following statements, we refer the reader to Aerts & Sassoli de
Bianchi, 2014a):
(1) First, one shows that any probability densityρ can be described
as the limit of a suitably chosen sequence cellular probability
densities ρnc , as the number of cells nc tends to infinity, in the
sense that for every initial state x and final state x′, we can
always find a sequence of cellular ρnc , such that the transition
probability P(x → x′|ρnc ) tends to P(x → x′|ρ), as nc → ∞.
By a cellular probability density wemean a probability density
describing a structuremade of a total number nc of regular cells
(of whatever shape), which tessellate the hypersurface of the
simplex SN−1. These nc cells can only be of two sorts: uniformly
breakable, or uniformly unbreakable.
(2) Thanks to the fact that a cellular probability density ρnc is only
made of a finite number nc of cells, which can either be of
the breakable or unbreakable kind, if we exclude the totallyunbreakable case of a ρnc describing a structure only made
of unbreakable cells (which would produce no outcomes in
a measurement), we have that the total number of possible
cellular ρnc is C
0
nc + C1nc + C2nc + · · · + Cncnc − 1 = 2nc −
1. Therefore, for each nc , we can unambiguously define the
average probability:
P(x→ x′|nc) ≡ 12nc − 1

ρnc
P(x→ x′|ρnc ), (36)
where the sum runs over all the possible 2nc − 1 cellular
probability densities made of nc cells. Clearly, P(x → x′|nc) is
the probability of transition x→ x′, when a cellular probability
density ρnc (a cellular hypermembrane) is chosen uniformly at
random. Since the total number of different possible ρnc , for a
given nc , is finite, there are no ‘‘Bertrand paradox’’ ambiguities
in the definition of the uniform average (36), which is therefore
unique.
Thanks to the above, we can now define a general universal
measurement euniv (which can be either non-degenerate or
degenerate, depending on whether the uniform average involves
non-degenerate or degenerate measurements, distinguishing or
not distinguishing all the possible N outcomes) as follows:
Definition (Universal Measurement). A measurement is said to be
a universal measurement euniv if the probabilities associatedwith all
its possible transitions x → x′ are the result of a uniform average
over all possible measurements eρ , described by all possible
probability densities ρ, as defined by the infinite-cell limit:
Puniv(x→ x′) = lim
nc→∞
P(x→ x′|nc), (37)
where P(x→ x′|nc) is the average (36).
Thanks to the above definition, we are now in a position to
enunciate the following theorem, which connects the universal
measurements with the measurements described by the uniform
Lebesgue measure (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a):
Theorem (Universal⇔ Uniform). A universal measurement euniv is
probabilistically equivalent to a measurement eρu , defined in terms
of a uniform probability density ρu, in the sense that for all possible
transitions x→ x′, we have the equality:
Puniv(x→ x′) = P(x→ x′|ρu). (38)
From the above theorem, and the previous representation theo-
rem, we can then deduce the following corollary:
Corollary. If the structure of the set of states of an arbitrary entity
is Hilbertian, then the universal measurements performed on that
entity are quantum measurements, in the sense that the universal
measurements will produce the same values for the outcome’s
probabilities as those predicted by the Born rule.
It is important to note that the above does not mean that quan-
tum measurements, performed on microscopic entities, would
necessarily be universal measurements. This for the time being re-
mains an open question. What we know however is that the huge
average involved in a universal measurement is certainly compat-
ible with this interpretation.
Concerningmeasurements on cognitive entities, the situation is
different, as in this case we have good arguments to affirm that the
measurements are the result of an average, considering that they
are performed using a number of different subjects, i.e., of different
minds, and that even a single mind, in two different moments, can
use in principle different ways of choosing the possible outcomes.
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universal average, and considering the great success obtained so
far by quantum physics in the modeling of human cognition, there
are reasons to believe that themeasurements performed by human
subjects on cognitive entities are in fact universal measurements.
This does not mean however that they would strictly be quantum
measurements, as the structure of the set of states may not be
exactly Hilbertian.
However, what we can say, thanks to our result, is that the
model which is behind cognitive measurements does certainly
admit a first order approximation, and that whenever the states of
the conceptual entity (or the decision process) under investigation
is conveniently described by a Hilbert space model, then such a
first order approximation precisely corresponds to the quantum
mechanical Born rule. And this certainly adds a fascinating piece
of explanation as to why quantummechanics is so successful, also
in the description of layers of our reality which are different from
the microphysical one.
Before moving to the next session, where we will emphasize
the fundamental difference between the GTR-model and the UTR-
model, when sequential measurements are considered, we would
like to conclude the present one by addressing a possible objection,
which is the following. Gleason’s theorem, as usually understood,
tells us that the Born rule is the only possible measure to be
used when computing probabilities in a Hilbert space. Therefore,
when the state space is Hilbertian, the Born rule seems to be the
only possible measure, and one may wonder about the relevance
of the Corollary enunciated in the previous section, stating that,
within a Hilbert space, universal measurements deliver the same
probabilities as those predicted by the Born rule.
To answer this objection, it is important to understand that
Gleason’s theorem does not tell us that, if we consider a different
measure than the Born rule, we cannot remain anymore inside a
Hilbert state space. We certainly cannot do it if we want that this
different measure, similarly to the Born rule, only depends on the
initial and final states. However, if we relax such condition, then
Gleason’s theorem does not apply anymore, and we can consider
all sorts of ‘‘parameters-dependent’’ probability measures within
a given Hilbertian state space. Now, when considering all these
different probability measures, associated with all the possible ρ
in our GTR-model, we can certainly also consider their (universal)
average, and when we do so what we obtain is that such average
gives back a uniform ρu, in turn associated with the Born rule.
This provides a possible explanation of why Gleason’s theorem
imposes us the Born rule as the only consistent rule to be used
within a Hilbert space: it would be so because, by asking that the
probability measure only depends on the initial state and the final
state (or final subspace), it indirectly points to the existence of a
physical mechanism that would make such probability measure
independent of any other parameter, and our point is that such
mechanism is precisely the fact that, in practice, measurements
are averages over different measurements, so that the Born rule
becomes an effective probability measure obtained by averaging
over the different ρ-dependent probabilities measures, with the
effect that the obtained average measure will only depend on the
initial and final states.
There is another point to emphasize: Gleason’s theorem only
exists for Hilbert spaces. However, it is not impossible to imagine
that generalized Gleason’s theorems could also be proved for
more general state spaces, pointing to generalized Born rules.
These generalized Born rules would be associated, according to
our theorem, to uniform ρu. In quantum mechanics we know
that the structure of the state space is Hilbertian, and therefore
the uniform ρu are precisely those associated with the Born rule.
In cognitive systems we have not yet identified the structure of
the set of states, but if our hypothesis regarding the fact thatcognitive measurements are (universal) averages over different
measurements is correct, we know that uniform ρu should be used,
and consequently, if the state space is close to a Hilbert space, such
uniform ρu will be close to the Born rule.
7. Non-Kolmogorovian and non-Hilbertian structures
In the previous sections we have defined and analyzed a very
general notion ofmeasurement, that we have called universal mea-
surement, describing a situation of lack of knowledge which does
not refer only to the pure measurement interactions which are ac-
tualized in an unpredictable way, but more generally to the differ-
ent ‘‘ways of choosing’’ these puremeasurements, as defined by the
different a priori possible probability densitiesρ. In this section,we
want to explicitly show that universal measurements, with their
averages, do genuinely describe a deeper level of potentiality, with
respect for instance to uniform measurements, in the sense that
when we consider measurements characterized by different ρ, we
are truly considering a vaster class of measurements, associated
with different probability models.
It is indeed natural to ask if a measurement characterized by a
non-uniform probability density ρ, would really be fundamentally
different than a measurement described by a uniform probability
density ρu. Now, from a physical point of view, it is perfectly
clear that, given a state x, if we perform a series of measurements
with a uniform hypermembrane, and then we repeat them with
a non-uniform one, different values for the probabilities of the
outcomes will be obtained. However, one could object that these
two measurements are in fact structurally equivalent, considering
that the UTR-model is already a ‘‘universal probabilistic machine’’
(Aerts & Sozzo, 2012a). This because, given a non-uniform ρ, and
a particle in the state x, it is always possible to find a new ρ-
dependent state xρ , such that P(x → xˆi|ρ) = P(xρ → xˆi|ρu),
for all i ∈ IN . In other terms, in the UTR-model it is always possible
to fully incorporate into the state of the particle the effects of a
non-uniform ρ, and therefore, from that perspective, a uniform
probability density and a non-uniform one appear to describe the
same measurement situation.
But this equivalence between the UTR-model, defined in terms
of a uniform probability distribution ρu, and what we have called
the GTR-model, which uses general probability distributions ρ, is
such only if we limit the discussion to a single measurement situ-
ation. Indeed, it is when more than a single measurement is con-
sidered, and probabilities associatedwith sequential or conditional
measurements are calculated, that the greater structural richness
of the GTR-model can be fully revealed. It is precisely the purpose
of the present section to show, bymeans of suitable counter exam-
ples, that when probabilities are defined by means of non-uniform
ρ, and multiple measurements are considered, the obtained prob-
abilities do not necessarily fit into a Kolmogorovian or Hilbertian
model, so that the GTR-model does truly generalize the UTR-model
and the Hilbert-model.
To point out the fundamental difference between uniform
probability densities (compatible with the quantum mechanical
Born rule) and non-uniform ones, we first need to introduce some
additional structure. Indeed, it is important to observe that the UTR
and GTR models, defined on a single simplex, do not possess per
se enough structure to describe in a complete way the different
possible states of an entity, in a general experimental setting.
Indeed, the UTR and GTR models provide a description only of
whatwemay call a ‘‘nakedmeasurement’’, i.e., of that ‘‘potentiality
region’’ of contact between the ‘‘outer’’ states of the entity under
investigation and the ‘‘inner’’ states of the measuring apparatus.
But a general measurement context contains more information
than just that associatedwith these ‘‘naked’’ hidden-measurement
interactions, like for instance, in physics, that describing the
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Euclidean space (e.g., the orientation of themagnetic field gradient
in a typical Stern–Gerlach spin experiment). So, to obtain a
more complete and articulated description of the measurement
process, this additional information must also be included in the
mathematical description of the states of the entity.
What we are here emphasizing is that in physics probabilities
are defined by the combination of two important aspects: the first
one is the probability model itself, which originates from the way
the different measurement interactions are each time selected,
when outcomes are collected; this aspect is described in the GTR-
model by the given of a probability distribution ρ, which defines
the way an elastic hypermembrane breaks; the second aspect is
the one coming from the specific spatial orientation and/or location
of the measuring apparatuses (polarizers, Stern–Gerlach magnets,
etc.) and is usually also incorporated in the way states are defined.
As far as we know, this second aspect has not been yet clearly
identified and formalized in the description of measurement situ-
ations in cognitive experiments. However, it is certainly a relevant
aspect in that ambit as well. To better explainwhatwemean, let us
consider the typical modeling of a concept in cognition (a similar
reasoning can also be made for the modeling of a ‘decision situa-
tion’), such as the concept Fruit. Even before considering any spe-
cific measurement, we can affirm that the concept Fruit can exist
in different states. There is of course the ground state of the con-
cept, corresponding to the idealized situation where the concept
presents itself in its ‘‘neutral’’ form, i.e., not under the influence of
any specific context; but countless excited states can also be de-
scribed. These excited states can be prepared by simply exposing
the concept to the influence of a specific context (Aerts & Gabora,
2005a; Gabora & Aerts, 2002). For instance, when the concept Fruit
is combined in the phrase This is a very juicy fruit, its state is very
different than when in its ground state.
This difference can be observed when the concept is submitted
to a measurement, during which a human mind is asked to select
a good exemplar of it, among a given number of possible choices
(corresponding to the different possible outcomes of that specific
measurement). The difference between the ground state Fruit and
the excited state This is a very juicy fruit, then manifests in the fact
that certain exemplars – likeOrange, Pineapple and Grapes –will be
chosen much more frequently when the concept is in its excited
‘‘juicy’’ state, rather than in its ground state.
To be a littlemore specific, let us denote byΣ the state-space of
a conceptual entity – in our example the concept Fruit – i.e., the set
of all its possible states, which is clearly a very big set, considering
that it contains all possible concept combinations involving that
concept. Different possible measurements eρ{1}···{N} (for simplicity,
we limit our discussion to non-degenerate ones) can obviously be
conceived and performed on it, differing not only in terms of the
possible choices of a ρ, but also with regard to the number of
outcomes, and the specific states characterizing these outcomes.
Now, given a state s ∈ Σ , a series of measurements eρ{1}···{N} on
that state will produce N different probabilities p1, . . . , pN , and
according to (35) these probabilities are representable, in the GTR-
model, by considering a suitable point xs in a (N − 1)-dimensional
simplex SN−1, which is the simplex associated with that specific
measurement. This means that we can infer the existence of a map
Mwhich, to each possible state s of the entity under consideration,
and to each possible measurement eρ{1}···{N}, associates a (N − 1)-
dimensional point xs on a simplex SN−1, in such a way that the
probabilities of that measurement can be deduced:
M : Σ → SN−1
s →M(s) = xs. (39)
So, according to the above, we can in principle distinguish two
different stages in a measurement. The first stage corresponds tothat deterministic process during which the state of the concept is
first ‘‘brought into contact’’ with the ‘decision context,’ which then
produces the indeterministic choice of a specific exemplar. In the
physical realization of the GTR-model that we have proposed in
this article, and in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014a), this cor-
responds to the movement through which the particle reaches the
sticky hypermembrane. This first stage of the measurement is rep-
resented by the action of the above mentioned mapM, i.e., it cor-
responds to the positioning of the particle in the right location on
SN−1. When such location is reached, the second stage of the mea-
surement, corresponding to the collapse of the hypermembrane,
can then happen, thus producing one of the possible outcomes.
Whatwe are here evidencing is that contexts canwork both de-
terministically and indeterministically (Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b),
and that when we describe a measurement in very general terms,
both aspects will be present. The deterministic aspect corresponds
to that stage of a measurement during which the subject first puts
itself in the suitable ‘decision context,’ creating in this way a sort of
‘cognitive tension’ (represented by the elasticity of themembrane).
Once this stage is completed, i.e., once the state of the concept is
brought into the right position, ‘ready for a choice to be made,’ the
second stage of the measurement (that above we have called the
‘‘naked’’ measurement) can be implemented, so producing a spe-
cific outcome-state, resulting from the sudden and unpredictable
reduction of such cognitive tension.
Now, as we said, and as far as we know, the general description
of this ‘‘double stage’’ process has not yet been incorporated in
more articulated quantum models of cognition and decision, at
least not for an arbitrary number N of outcomes, and it is certainly
our goal to analyze this problem in future research. But what
we wanted to emphasize here is the importance of the interplay
between these two different stages, in the characterization of
the probability model which describes the different possible
measurements that one can perform on a given conceptual (or
microscopic) entity. And the purpose of the present section,
as already mentioned, is to show this explicitly, in the simple
situation where the measurements considered can only have two
possible outcomes.
In physics, this is precisely the situation of typical spin-
1/2 measurements, where different relative orientations of the
Stern–Gerlach apparatus, with respect to an incoming electron
prepared in a given spin state, are considered, defining in this
way different measurements. In this ambit, the state-space Σ is
a sphere (the so-called Poincaré or Bloch sphere), and the different
two-outcome measurements can be represented by 1-simplexes
which can have different orientations inside of it. As we will see,
the mapM will then correspond to the ‘‘movement of fall’’ of the
point particle, initially on the surface of the sphere, onto the 1-
simplex elastic band of themeasurement under consideration; and
when considering this additional state-space structure, it is easy to
show that non-uniform probability densities ρ cannot anymore be
considered equivalent, from a probabilistic viewpoint, to uniform
probability density ρu.
So,we consider now the physical situation of a one-dimensional
elastic band (the N = 2, two-outcome case) embedded in the
structure of a 2-sphere S2, of radius 1√
2
, centered at the origin of the
Cartesian coordinate system inR3; a situation knownas the sphere-
model4 (Aerts et al., 1997), which in turn is a generalization of the
so-called ϵ-model (Aerts, 1998, 1999b; Sassoli de Bianchi, 2013a,b).
More precisely, the initial state of thematerial point particle is now
a point5 w ∈ S2. A two-outcome measurement eρ(u) ≡ eρ{1}{2}(u)
consists then in the following operations (see Fig. 8(a)): a ρ-elastic
4 Note that in the usual description of the sphere-model, the sphere is of unit
radius. Here we choose a sphere of radius 1√
2
, to establish a clearer correspondence
with the GTR-model.
5 We have changed notation, using the letter w instead of the letter x, to
generically denote states, to make clear that these now belong to the 2-sphere S2 ,
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ρ-elastic band stretched along the two end-points u and−u. Once the particle has fallen orthogonally onto the elastic (so defining the two regions A1 and A2), it sticks onto
it, at point a, and when the latter breaks, two outcomes are possible: the particle is drawn to point u (outcome 1), or to point−u (outcome 2). In (b), a measurement eρϵ (u)
is represented, with a ρϵ-elastic which can uniformly break inside a central region of length
√
2ϵ (the gray segment), with ϵ ∈ [0, 1], and is perfectly unbreakable outside
of it (the two black lateral segments).band is stretched and fixed at two diametrically opposite points u
and−u of the 2-sphere, and once this is done, the particle in state
w ‘‘falls’’ orthogonally onto the elastic and sticks on it, at point a.
Then, the elastic breaks, and draws the particle either to point u
(outcome 1), or to point−u (outcome 2).
Introducing the angle θ ≡ θ(w,u) between the two vectors w
and u, we have that a = cos θ u, with cos θ = 2w · u, so that the
two regions A2 and A1, generated by the presence of the particle
on the elastic, correspond to the two intervals [ cos θ√
2
, 1√
2
] and
[− 1√
2
, cos θ√
2
], respectively. Therefore, the probabilities to obtain
outcomes 1 and 2, respectively, when eρ(u) is performed, are given
by the two integrals:
P(w→ u|ρ) = P(A1|ρ) =
 cos θ√
2
− 1√
2
ρ(z)dz, (40)
P(w→−u|ρ) = P(A2|ρ) =
 1√
2
cos θ√
2
ρ(z)dz. (41)
Let us consider a special choice of a non-uniform probability
density, which is the following: ρϵ(z) ≡ 1√2ϵχ[− ϵ√2 , ϵ√2 ](z), where
χ[− ϵ√
2
, ϵ√
2
] is the characteristic function of the interval [− ϵ√2 , ϵ√2 ],
and ϵ is a positive parameter which can take values between 0
and 1 (see Fig. 8(b)). Then, if we perform a measurement eρϵ (u)
associated with a ρϵ-elastic oriented along direction u, we observe
that if the initial state w of the particle is such that, when it
falls orthogonally onto the elastic, it lands on its left (resp. right)
unbreakable segment, then the probability for outcome 1 is equal
to 1 (resp. 0), and the probability for outcome 2 is equal to 0 (resp.
1). On the other hand, if the initial state w of the particle is such
that it lands on its central uniformly breakable segment (this is
the situation depicted in Fig. 8(b)), then the probabilities for the
two outcomes can be calculated by simply considering the ratio
between the length of the piece of breakable elastic between the
particle and the end-point, divided by the total length
√
2ϵ of the
breakable segment.
Putting all this together, one obtains the following formula:
P(w→±u|ρϵ) = δ±,−1Θ(− cos θ − ϵ)+ δ±,+1Θ(cos θ − ϵ)
+ 1
2

1± cos θ
ϵ

χ[−ϵ,ϵ](cos θ), (42)
and not to the 1-simplex S1 . Also, note that the origin of the coordinate system now
coincides with the center of the sphere.Fig. 9. Three different measurements eρϵ (u), eρϵ (v) and eρϵ (w), represented by
three ρϵ-elastic bands oriented along directions u, v andw, respectively. The angle
between w and v is π4 , and the angle between v and u is
π
2 . The unbreakable
segments of the elastics are in black color, the uniformly breakable segments in gray
color, and the picture corresponds to the choice ϵ =
√
2
2 (the breakable segments
are of length 1).
whereΘ denotes the Heaviside step function (equal to 1 when the
argument is positive and equal to 0 otherwise), and δ denotes the
Kronecker delta (equal to 1 when the two indices are the same
and equal to 0 otherwise). Clearly, in the limit ϵ → 0, ρϵ(z) →
ρ0(z) = δ(z), i.e., the elastic becomes only breakable in its middle
point and therefore corresponds to a pure measurement, with
no fluctuations, and the third term of (42) vanishes, so that one
recovers an almost classical situation (almost because for cos θ =
±ϵ we are in a situation of unstable equilibrium).
In the opposite limit ϵ → 1, that is ρϵ(z) → ρ1(z) =
1√
2
χ[− 1√
2
, 1√
2
](z) ≡ ρu(z), the first two terms of (42) vanish,
and the third one tends to the quantum probabilities describing
a Stern–Gerlachmeasurement with a spin-1/2microscopic entity:
P(w→±u|ρu) = 12 (1± cos θ)
= δ±,−1 sin2 θ2 + δ±,+1 cos
2 θ
2
. (43)
On the other hand, for ϵ ≠ 0, 1, we are in a situation of intermedi-
ate knowledge, where depending on the value taken by θ , we can
either predict with certainty the outcome (if | cos θ | > ϵ), or not (if
| cos θ | < ϵ). This situation cannot be fitted, in general, neither into
a classical probabilitymodel nor into a quantumone,which iswhat
we are now going to show. For this, we assume that ϵ ∈ [0,
√
2
2 ],
and we consider three different measurements: eρϵ (u), eρϵ (v) and
eρϵ (w), with an angle of π4 between w and v, and an angle
π
2 be-
tween v and u (see Fig. 9).
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We start by showing, by means of a reasoning of reductio ad
absurdum, that the joint probabilities of sequential measurements
cannot be fitted into a classical probability model using a single
sample space, described by events associated with the states u, v
and w. For this, we observe that if U , V and W are three arbitrary
events (elements of a σ -algebra of subsets of a sample space),
and U c , V c and W c are their complement, then, according to
classical probability theory (obeying Kolmogorovian axioms), if P
is a probability measure, then the following three equalities hold:
P(V ∩W ) = P(U ∩ V ∩W )+ P(U c ∩ V ∩W ), (44)
P(U ∩W ) = P(U ∩ V ∩W )+ P(U ∩ V c ∩W ), (45)
P(U c ∩ V ) = P(U c ∩ V ∩W )+ P(U c ∩ V ∩W c). (46)
Eq. (44) minus (45) gives:
P(U c ∩ V ∩W ) = [P(V ∩W )− P(U ∩W )]
+ P(U ∩ V c ∩W ), (47)
and considering that the last term in (47) is positive, we have:
P(U c ∩ V ∩W ) ≥ [P(V ∩W )− P(U ∩W )]. (48)
Also, from (46), we can deduce that
P(U c ∩ V ∩W ) ≤ P(U c ∩ V ), (49)
and putting together (48) and (49), we obtain:
[P(V ∩W )− P(U ∩W )] ≤ P(U c ∩ V ∩W ) ≤ P(U c ∩ V ), (50)
which implies that:
[P(V ∩W )− P(U ∩W )] ≤ P(U c ∩ V ). (51)
So, if we can prove that equality (51) is violated by the ϵ-model
(here with ϵ ∈ [0,
√
2
2 ]), thenwe have also proved that it cannot be
fitted into a classical probabilistic model. For this, we assume that
the particle is in statew, i.e., an eigenstate of measurement eρϵ (w).
This means that if we perform eρϵ (w), we will obtain outcome 1
with certainty, i.e., P(→ w|w) = 1. The probability of obtaining
outcome v, when we perform eρϵ (v), with the particle in state w,
is also equal to 1, i.e., P(→ v|w) = 1, since the particle falls on
the unbreakable segment with end point v, as one can easily check
on Fig. 9. Therefore, the joint probability that, given the particle
in state w, we obtain first state w, then state v, in a sequential
measurement, is P(→ w → v|w) = P(→ w|w)P(→ v|w) =
1 · 1 = 1. On the other hand, since P(→ u|w) = 0 (see Fig. 9),
we also have that P(→ w → u|w) = P(→ w|w)P(→ u|w) =
1 ·0 = 0. Also, considering that whenwe perform eρϵ (u), a particle
in state v falls exactly on the middle point of the elastic, we have
P(→ v → −u|w) = P(→ v|w)P(→ −u|v) = 1 · 12 = 12 . Thus,
being that [1− 0] > 12 , we obtain:
[P(→ w→ v|w)− P(→ w→ u|w)] > P(→ v→−u|w), (52)
which is clearly a violation of (51).
Note that, for simplicity, we have here constructed a counter
example only using probabilities of sequential measurements, in-
terpreted as joint probabilities. An alternative ex absurdum proof,
using instead conditional probabilities, can also be constructed,
considering a situation where there is an additional lack of knowl-
edge about the state of the particle, described by a uniform
probability distribution. Then, choosing again three suitable mea-
surements, one can show that Bayes’ rule for conditional probabili-
ties is violated. The calculation of conditional probabilities, with an
additional mixture of states, is however much more involved, and
for the proof we refer the interested reader to Aerts (1986, 1995).The probability model is non-quantum
Let us now show that the probabilities of sequential measure-
ments cannot be fitted into a quantum probability model. We
denote by |ψu⟩ and |ψ−u⟩ the two orthonormal eigenstates associ-
ated with the two outcomes of measurement eρϵ (u), respectively.
Similarly, we denote by |ψv⟩ and |ψ−v⟩ those associatedwithmea-
surement eρϵ (v), and by |ψw⟩ and |ψ−w⟩ those associated with
eρϵ (w). According to the standard quantum formalism, if the ini-
tial state of the system is |ψw⟩, we can write:
1 = P(→ w→ v|w) = |⟨ψv|ψw⟩|2|⟨ψw|ψw⟩|2
= |⟨ψv|ψw⟩|2, (53)
1 = P(→ w→−u|w) = |⟨ψ−u|ψw⟩|2|⟨ψw|ψw⟩|2
= |⟨ψ−u|ψw⟩|2, (54)
1
2
= P(→ v→ u|w) = |⟨ψu|ψv⟩|2|⟨ψv|ψw⟩|2
= |⟨ψu|ψv⟩|2, (55)
where for (54) we have used P(→ w → −u|w) = P(→
w|w)P(→ −u|w) = 1 · 1 = 1, and for (55) we have used (53)
and P(→ v → u|w) = P(→ v|w)P(→ u|v) = 1 · 12 = 12 . Clearly,
(53) implies that ⟨ψ−w|ψv⟩ = 0, (54) that ⟨ψu|ψw⟩ = 0, and (55)
that ⟨ψu|ψv⟩ ≠ 0. Therefore:
0 ≠ ⟨ψu|ψv⟩ = ⟨ψu|ψw⟩⟨ψw|ψv⟩ + ⟨ψu|ψ−w⟩⟨ψ−w|ψv⟩
= 0, (56)
which is clearly a contradiction, showing that there does not
exist a two-dimensional Hilbert space model such that the above
sequential transition probabilities can be described in this Hilbert
space.
It is not difficult to analyze the above three measurements
also for values ϵ ∈ [
√
2
2 , 1], and show that (52) continues to
hold, which means that for all values ϵ ∈ [0, 1], the ϵ-model is
non-Kolmogorovian. Using Accardi-Fedullo inequalities (Accardi &
Fedullo, 1982), it is also possible to show that in general no Hilbert
spacemodel exists, except for the uniform ϵ = 1 case (Aerts, Aerts,
Durt, & Lévêque, 1999).
It follows from the above analysis that when non-uniform
probability densities and different measurements are considered
(i.e., different simplexes), the overall probability model will be in
general non-Hilbertian and non-Kolmogorovian, with the Hilber-
tian structure corresponding only to the special case of a uniform
probability density ρu. Of course, each single measurement can
be described within a single Kolmogorovian probability space (in
accordance with the fact that the UTR-model is a universal single-
measurement probabilistic machine6), but when different se-
quences ofmeasurements are considered, and compared, the over-
all probability model will be in general non-Kolmogorovian and
non-Hilbertian. Indeed, the actual structure of the model depends
on the specific choice of the ρ describing how the elastic structures
break (and on the structure of the set of states which are mapped
to points on the simplexes), and this means that the GTR-model
constitutes a truly more general theoretical framework, able to ex-
tend its ‘‘structural reach’’ far beyond that of the UTR-model and
Hilbert-model.
But the above sphere-model example also shows that, although
non-uniform ρ can give rise to non-Hilbertian probability models,
as soon as universal measurements are considered, i.e., averages
over all possible probability densities ρ are taken, being that
these averages will give back an effective condition of uniform
6 When only a single measurement is considered, also the Hilbert-model is of
course Kolmogorovian.
72 D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75fluctuation, the Hilbertian structure for the set of states can also
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A last remark is in order. Although in our model all the
probabilities are calculated within a Lebesgue measure context,
it would not be correct to think of it in classical terms (for
instance as a Markov chain), when used to describe sequential
measurements. Let us note in this regard that in a Markov chain,
andmore generally in a classical stochastic process, all the random
variables are defined with respect to a same probability space, and
in particular to a same σ -algebra of events. On the other hand, the
transition probabilities arising from the application in sequence
of the UTR-model (or more generally of the GTR-model), cannot
be fit into a single algebra of events, even though the individual
probabilities are calculated, in each singlemeasurement, bymeans
of a classical Lebesgue measure. The reason for this is that in
our model each measurement brings its own specific input of
randomness, in a way that makes the different measurements
mutually incompatible, which is not the case for a classical
stochastic process, where all the randomness comes from a lack
of knowledge about the state of the considered entity.
The general N-outcome situation
The previous analysis is only valid for the two-outcome (qubit)
situation (N = 2). Therefore, onemight ask if the Corollarywehave
enunciated in the previous section, expressing the equivalence
between universalmeasurements and quantummeasurements (as
described by the Born rule), when the structure of the set of states
is Hilbertian, also applies in general, or is just a two-dimensional
anomaly. Indeed, a full ‘‘membrane modelization’’ of the quantum
measurement process was only provided in the two-outcome
situation, by means of the sphere-model, while for a general N-
outcome situation we have only provided a description of the
‘‘naked’’ part of the measurement process. The following question
therefore arises: Is it possible to provide a complete description of
a quantum measurement (also valid for degenerate observables),
in the case of a general finite-dimensional Hilbert space?
Undoubtedly, only if such a description can be obtained we can
affirm that the UTR probability model, when the state space is
Hilbertian, becomes perfectly equivalent to the probability model
generated (within the same state space) by the Born rule, and this
not only for single measurements, but also for arbitrary sequential
measurements, in accordancewith the projection postulate. To put
the same question in different terms: Is it possible to generalize the
sphere-model for a quantum entity having an arbitrary number N
of dimensions? Also, can we inscribe and orient, within a suitable
geometric structure, the different (N − 1)-simplexes associated
with all possible observables, and specify in this ambit the nature
of the deterministic map M that, to each state in HN = CN ,
associates a specific point on the (N − 1)-simplex describing the
measurement under consideration, in a way that systematically
works for any possible choice of measurement (that is, for any
possible choice of physical observable)?
When this article, and its companion (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014a), were submitted for publication, this question was still an
open one. However, very recently we succeeded in fully determin-
ing themapM, and themathematical structure that naturally con-
tains all the possible measurement simplexes associated with a
N-dimensional quantum entity, thus obtaining a general hidden-
measurements solution to the quantum measurement problem,
for general N-outcome experiments (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi,
2014b).
Let us just briefly mention here that for more than two
outcomes, the three-dimensional Bloch-sphere representation is
replaced by a (N2 − 1)-dimensional generalized Bloch-sphere
representation, but only a convex portion of such generalized
sphere can be filled with states. However, similarly to the two-
dimensional situation, the map M still describes a point particle‘‘orthogonally falling’’ onto the measurement simplex. When the
measurement is degenerate, the process is a littlemore articulated,
in the sense that there is not only a deterministic process through
which the point particle enters into contact with the membrane,
but also a possible final deterministic movement, following the
membrane’s collapse, bringing the point particle back to a maxi-
mum distance from the center of the simplex, in accordance with
Lüders–von Neumann projection formula.
This hidden-measurements description of a general quantum
measurement is quite involvedmathematically speaking, as it uses
the properties of the generators of the group SU(N), the spe-
cial unitary group of degree N , and the representation of quan-
tum states as density operators. Therefore, we refer the interested
reader to Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014b), for the mathemat-
ical details. As regards the present analysis, what is important to
keep in mind is that a more general description exists, so that
the equivalence between the UTR-model and the Born rule, as ex-
pressed in the Corollary of Section 6, has a very general validity.
8. Conclusion
To conclude, we briefly summarize the results we have pre-
sented in this article. We have introduced an abstract model – the
UTR-model – which like the Hilbert-model of quantum mechan-
ics is able to describe all possible probabilities in a given single
measurement context. We have also shown that the UTR-model
admits a simple physical realization, in which measurements are
described as actions performed on a point particle by means of
special, uniformly breakable elastic hypermembranes. These hy-
permembranes can also be understood as the exemplification of
psychological processes duringwhich a human subject reduces the
tension of a mental state of equilibrium, between different com-
peting alternatives, by means of a random perturbation, breaking
in this way the symmetry of the equilibrium and bringing the sys-
tem into a more stable and less tensional condition.
The UTR-model illustrates in a detailed way what possibly
happens during a measurement, when the initial state in which
the entity is prepared collapses into a final state, showing that the
process can be understood in terms of an actualization of hidden
potential interactions, which (almost) deterministically bring the
entity into its final state. We have also shown that a symmetrical
interpretation is also possible, where the potentiality is the result
of a uniformmixture of state, instead of a uniformmixture of pure
measurements.
Despite the already great generality of the UTR-model, we
have motivated the introduction of an even more general model,
that we have called the GTR-model, which employs non uniform
hypermembranes (non-uniform probability densities), describing
all possible kinds of quantum and quantum-like measurements,
including the pure deterministic and pure solipsistic ones.
In themuch ampler structural ambit of the GTR-model, we have
then considered the possibility of performing uniform averages
over all possible choices of non-uniform probability densities
ρ, i.e., averages over all possible probability models which can
in principle be actualized in a given experimental context. This
uniform average is what we have called a universal measurement,
to which we have given a mathematically precise and physically
transparent definition, as the limit of an average over finite
structures, so bypassing (i.e., solving) the well known difficulties
of so-called Bertrand paradox (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014c).
A universal measurement corresponds to the situation were
not only there is lack of knowledge about which specific hidden
interaction is actualized during the measurement, but also about
the way this interaction is selected. This means that a universal
measurement corresponds to a situation of maximum possible
lack of knowledge, involving a double level of randomization: one
D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75 73related to the choice of the measurement itself, and one related
to the actualization of the hidden deterministic interaction within
that chosen measurement.
The result we have outlined – which we will prove in Aerts
and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014a) – is that the ‘‘huge’’ randomization
of a universal measurement produces exactly the same numerical
values for the transition probabilities as those delivered by a
uniform probability density, i.e., by the Lebesgue measure on
the simplexes; and since the latter is compatible with the Born
rule, this also means that quantum measurements can actually be
understood as universal measurements, thus adding an important
piece of explanation regarding the effectiveness of the quantum
model in somany different ambits, such as that of human cognition
and decision.
These results are significant for cognitive science, considering
that the hypothesis of the conceptual-mental layer of individual
subjects participating in experiments to contain deep variations
is a plausible one. Hence, our analysis indicates that it may be
possible that more careful and numerous cognitive experiments
would reveal that the average which is at play is not as huge
and systematic as the quantum mechanical average, so that the
statistics of outcomes may actually deviate from that predicted
by an effective uniform ρu, and therefore also from the Born rule.
This possible deviation, however, can only be evidenced when
considering experimental situations involving more than a single
measurement (sequential measurements), as we have shown in
Section 7.
More specifically, in the special case of two-outcome measure-
ments, and in the ambit of the so-called sphere-model (see Aerts
& Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014b for its recent N-dimensional general-
ization), which takes into consideration the full geometry of the
Hilbert state space, we have shown that the GTR-model is a much
more general framework than the UTR-model, in the sense that it
can generate probabilities that cannot fit into a Kolmogorovian or
Hilbertian model. This means that universal measurements, when
considered from the viewpoint of sequential measurements, are
not only averages over different probability values, but also aver-
ages over different probability models.
In any case, even if the effective uniform ρu, i.e., the ‘‘Lebesgue
rule’’ on the simplexes (which becomes exactly the Born rule when
the structure of the set of states is Hilbertian) will prove in the
future not to always be the good rule to apply to infer the statistics
of outcomes of cognitive experiments, or other experiments in
other regions of reality, it follows from the present analysis that,
in the absence of a specific knowledge about how an experiment
is specifically conducted, it certainly constitutes the best possible
prediction, as it corresponds to a ‘first order non-classical theory,’
expressing a condition ofmaximum lack of knowledge and control.
Let us conclude by saying that the results presented in this
article, which will be further explored in its second part (Aerts &
Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014a), are of special interest also for physics.
Our results contain a potential deep explanation for what happens
during a quantum measurement in micro-physics, and further
more refined experiments might explore this explanation. Indeed,
if this explanation is correct, the fact that quantum mechanics
describes a statistics of outcomes that goes along with a uniform
at-random choice between any arbitrary type of manipulation
that changes an initial state of the entity under study into a
final state, in a way that we do not know anything about the
mechanism of this change of state, reveals then, that the micro-
layer of our physical reality is characterizable by a much deeper
level of potentiality than was initially expected. In the sense
that, apparently, all possible measurements are also equipossible
measurements, which are in principle actualizable and actualized
in the laboratory. If we have not realized this so far, it could be
because these measurements remain hidden, and their differentindividual statistics of outcomes are fused together, in a unique
statistics, equivalent to that delivered by the Born rule.
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Appendix A. The uniform probability density
To calculate the probability (32) we follow here the derivation
in Aerts (1986). We observe that the Lebesgue measure of SN−1 is
µL(SN−1) =
√
N
(N−1)! (for N = 2, it corresponds to the length
√
2 of
the line segment S1, for N = 3, to the area
√
3
2 of the equilateral
triangle S2, for N = 4, to the volume 13 of the regular tetrahedron
S3, and so on). Therefore, (32) becomes:
P(x→ xˆi) = (N − 1)!√
N
µL(Ai). (57)
To calculateµL(Ai), we canuse the generalization, for a convexhull,
of the well-known formula for the computation of the area of a
triangle, as the product of the length of its base times its height,
times 12 , which in the case of the (N − 1)-dimensional convex hull
Ai becomes:
µL(Ai) = 1N − 1µL(S
i
N−2)h
i(x) = 1
N − 1
√
N − 1
(N − 2)!h
i(x)
=
√
N − 1
(N − 1)!h
i(x), (58)
where S iN−2 is the (N − 2)-dimensional simplex generated by the
N − 1 orthonormal vectors xˆ1, . . . , xˆi−1, xˆi+1, . . . , xˆN+1, and hi(x)
is the smallest Euclidean distance between x and S iN−2. To calculate
hi(x), we observe that any point of S iN−2 can be written as yi =N
j=1
j≠i
yijxˆj, with
N+1
j=1
j≠i
yij = 1, so that the vector x− yi, on the line
connecting x and yi, is given by:
x− yi =
N
j=1
j≠i
(xj − yij)xˆj + xixˆi. (59)
To find the yi for which the distance ∥x − yi∥ is minimal, i.e., for
which ∥x−yi∥ = hi(x), we observe that for such vector x−yi must
be orthogonal to all vectors of the form xˆj− xˆk, with j, k ≠ i, that is,
(x−yi|xˆj−xˆk) = 0, for all j, k ≠ i. This implies that xj−yij = xk−yik,
for all j, k ≠ i, so that all the differences xj − yij, j ≠ i, must be
equal to a same constant c . To determine c , we use
N
j=1
j≠i
yij = 1
and
N
j=1
j≠i
xj = 1 − xi, to writeNj=1
j≠i
(xj − yij) = −xi. Therefore,
(N − 1)c = −xi, i.e., c = − xiN−1 . Eq. (59) then becomes:
x− yi = − xi
N
N
j=1
j≠i
xˆj + xixˆi, (60)
so that
hi(x) = ∥x− yi∥ =

x2i
N − 1
2
+ x2i =

N
N − 1 xi, (61)
74 D. Aerts, M. Sassoli de Bianchi / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 51–75Fig. 10. (a) A 2-dimensional triangular membrane which can only break at a single point λ (contrary to Fig. 3, the membrane is now represented in white, to mark the fact
that, with the exception of a single point, it is unbreakable), with the three quadrilateral regions Bi consisting of those initial states that are all drawn to the same outcome
xˆi, i = 1, 2, 3. (b) The same pure measurement represented as a point λ˜ in the 2-dimensional simplex generated by the final states of the measuring entity, with the region
Ai corresponding to those initial states of the point particle that change the state of the measuring entity into the final states λˆi, i = 1, 2, 3.and inserting (61) into (58), gives µL(Ai) =
√
N
(N−1)!xi, so that (57)
yields:
P(x→ xˆi) = xi, i ∈ IN . (62)
Appendix B. Mixed states: the 3-outcome case
We consider the situation of a pure measurement in the
presence of a uniform mixture of states, in the case N = 3 (see
Section 5). As it can be checked on Fig. 10(a), to obtain the states of
the point particle that are drawn to a same outcome xˆi, i = 1, 2, 3,
one has to prolong the lines that connect the vertex points of
S2 to λ, to the opposite sides of the 2-simplex. In this way, one
obtains three disjoint quadrilateral regions Bi, i = 1, 2, 3, and
by calculating their areas7 as a function of the components of λ,
one finds the probabilities P(→ xˆ1) = µL(B1)µL(S1) =
λ2λ3(1+λ1)
(1−λ2)(1−λ3) ,
P(→ xˆ2) = µL(B2)µL(S1) =
λ1λ3(1+λ2)
(1−λ3)(1−λ1) , and P(→ xˆ3) =
µL(B3)
µL(S1)
=
λ1λ2(1+λ3)
(1−λ1)(1−λ2) . As for the two-outcome case considered in Section 5,
we can represent these probabilities by considering an additional
2-simplex, with the state of the apparatus now described by a
vector λ˜ generating three triangular regions Ai (see Fig. 10(b)),
so that the probabilities can again be written in the simpler form
P(λ˜ → λˆi) = µL(Ai)µL(S2) = λ˜i, i = 1, 2, 3, and the connection with
the quantum mechanical Born rule is realized by describing the
state of the measuring entity by means of the Hilbert space vector
|φ⟩ =

λ˜1eiβ1 |b1⟩ +

λ˜2eiβ2 |b2⟩ +

λ˜3eiβ3 |b3⟩ ∈ H3.
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